Richard Smith and the Mystery of Pass Coverage

If you have read any of the previous Xs/Os things here at DGDB&D, it should be pretty clear that I am defense-first kind of guy. For every one article on zone blocking, there are at least four on some aspect of our defense or lack thereof.  It’s not that I don’t like offense, but given the choice I’d prefer to see Mario Williams knock someone unconscious than watch Owen Daniels get a first down.  I’m just odd, I s’pose.

Anyway, because I’m a defensive guy, watching Richard Smith’s approach to my favorite side of the ball has been especially painful.  Whether it’s repeatedly dropping Mario into coverage against a Tennessee team that didn’t really throw into the flat all day or benching his best cornerback in favor of someone who is in the conversation for worst player in the NFL, Smith consistently does everything wrong—and, conversely, nothing right—in his defensive playcalling.  We’ve covered the lack of blitzing and general lack of common sense and even offered up a possible solution (that Smith would never apply because it takes courage and vision).

The one thing we haven’t really covered, however, except in post-game griping and general comments about defensive failure, is our pass-coverage philosophy.  Yet, after seeing the predictable result of Petey Faggins one-on-one with a WR that only Nnamdi Asomugah could cover, I think it’s about time to tackle the defensive backfield.  I hope to tackle it better than Will Demps is tackling right now.

First, some background.  The Texans play a mix of man coverage (usually in the form of Cover-1 or Cover-2 Man) and Cover-2 zone.  Just so we are all on the same page, let’s look at each of those schemes.  (Note: as always, we are talking in generalizations here.  There are a million tiny variations to all of these…none of which Richard Smith understands.)

Man/Cover-1 Theory.  Our most common form of man coverage is the Cover-1.  (Our second-most common form is the Cover-2 Man, but we’ll hit on that in a minute.)  In Cover-1, the defense has one deep defender at or near the middle of the field (relative to the sidelines) and he is responsible for deep help.  Underneath, you will generally have pure man coverage from your CBs and LBs, with the other safety—usually the SS—free to assist in man coverage, sneak up for run support, or blitz.

If you are paying attention, you can see the biggest flaw in the Cover-1: the deep safety is responsible for a TON of real estate and if he lacks the speed or guesses wrong on where to go, it is almost impossible for him to recover.  Thus a Cover-1 requires a very good FS in the deep coverage.

Under Gregg Williams, the Redskins ran a Cover-1 as a base package quite a bit, with the thinking being that Sean Taylor was more than capable of playing the role.  He was, but Williams continually failed to realize that the scheme put a tremendous amount of pressure on his corners—because they absolutely had to avoid getting burned deep—and they were most certainly not up to that task.  Nevertheless, Williams’ reputation as an aggressive play-caller—a myth that we already addressed before the season—was due in large part to the Cover-1’s requirements.

What I mean by this is, because of the inherent flaw in Cover-1, teams that employ that coverage try to be more aggressive up front to prevent the opponent from having enough time to stretch the field and develop multiple deep routes, thereby protecting the safety.  To do this, the Cover-1 attempts to employ many different blitz packages/man assigments, most of which revolve around bringing the SS up to LB depth and, from here, either blitzing him or blitzing a LB or CB with that safety picking up the appropriate receiver.  For this to be effective, however, any non-blitzing CBs/LBs (especially the WLB) have to be able to cover until the pressure gets to the QB.

Cover-1 also suffers from plenty of room after the catch, as most or all of the underneath defenders are locked up in man coverage of their own and, should a WR catch the ball, are not in position to make a quick tackle.  (Think Greg Camarillo on a slant.)

Why it doesn’t work for the Texans. I think you see where I am going with this.  Basically, in this coverage, you are asking Will Demps to cover sideline to sideline, Brandon Harrison (or, prior, C.N. Brown) to lock up in man coverage, and Petey Faggins and Jacques Reeves to maintain tight man coverage until Richard Smith’s non-effective blitz package gets to the QB.  It should come as no surprise that, in the aforementioned Immolation Of The Faggins looked to be in Cover-1.  [EDIT:  Triple347 says the Johnson completion was in quarter-quarter-half coverage.  See comments for discussion.

Even worse, though, is that Smith bastardizes the hell out of his Cover-1.  Far be it from him to send the SS on a blitz.  No, he utilizes the SS almost entirely in pass coverage from the LB depth.  Meaning that teams with even two games worth of film on the Texans' D quickly figure out that the SS is bluffing and, thus, they don't try to account for him in blitz pickup.  Instead, they take advantage of the fact that our SSs don't backpedal all that well---most don't---and they abuse him in coverage or throw over the top of him if he is dropping back into a middle zone.

When Brown/Harrison aren't all the way up at LB depth, Smith sneaks the up toward the middle of the field and in behind DeMeco Ryans, almost as if they are playing some kind of non-commital run support.  Behind our best tackler.  Because he apparently needs the backup?

Cover-2/Cover-2 Man.  "Cover-2" might be the most overused and misunderstood phrase in football defense today.  Pretty much all teams will occasionally come out in something resembling a Cover-2, but most have a wrinkle of some sort because most lack the personnel to effectively run a true Cover-2.

Cover-2 is a 2-deep, 5-under zone system.  In this coverage, both safeties are responsible for half of the deep part of the field.  The CBs are in press coverage and are each responsible for 1/5th of the short/intermediate zone underneath the two safeties.  The three linebackers are each responsible for another 1/5.  Because the safeties will generally line up between their respective hashmark and the sideline and because they will work toward the sideline at the snap, the biggest hole in the Cover-2 coverage is in between them, behind the MLB.

[Quick side-note:  The Tampa-2 variant drops the MLB into deeper coverage to address the hole in the straight Cover-2 and has the CBs/remaining LBs responsible for 1/4th of the field each.]

Whereas the Cover-1 attempts to be aggressive up front to prevent the big play, the Cover-2 typically uses just the four-man rush and attempts to take away the big play by going into a bend-don’t-break mode.  There are holes in the coverage between the zones, so teams will tend to throw underneath the two safeties, which is just what the defense is encouraging.

In Cover-2 Man, the safeties still play the same way, but the coverage underneath is pure man.  The safeties help with deep coverage into their zones, but the man coverage will stay with the receivers through those zones as well, effectively leading to double-coverage on deep routes.

Regardless of whether the team is in Cover-2 or Cover-2 Man, the one place they should never, ever get beat deep is on the sidelines.  The CBs have the WRs through the intermediate zone and the safeties, who moved toward the sideline at the snap, pick them up as they get deeper.  Assuming your safeties can do that (and that your CBs consider basic things like “turn your head” and “don’t get roasted off the line”), the Cover-2 allows you to force teams to throw short-to-intermediate passes toward the middle of the field (thereby giving you the added benefit of forcing the opposition to throw the ball past many more hands), with the safeties coming up to make quick tackles.  Of course, that also requires that you have safeties that tackle well…

Why this doesn’t work for the Texans. Again, I think you see where this is headed.  The corners that Smith insists on giving the most reps are incapable of defending balls thrown over the top of them. The safeties seem incapable of giving help in the intermediate zone or in picking up WRs as they come into the deep zone.  Will Demps especially has the annoying habit of letting the WR coming into his zone get past him before he reacts.

It is telling that we are CONSISTENTLY beat along the sidelines at every depth.  The basic tenets of this coverage require that you have safeties who can defend the go/corner routes, not let WRs get behind them, and, most importantly, don’t get so worried about the underneath stuff that you bite on double-move.  Simply put, we don’t have that.

****

You see the most glaring common weakness through the whole discussion as it pertains to us?  OUR SAFETIES ARE NOT GOOD ENOUGH TO RUN ANY OF THE COVERAGES WE ARE ASKING THEM TO RUN.  Oh, sure, our Faggins and Reeves are very bad and they deserve their fair share of the blame—blame I am more than happy to heap on Petey at every opportunity—but at least we have Dunta Robinson, Fred Bennett, and Antwaun Molden available.  Cornerback could theoretically be fixed if the DC would use some common sense.  But we are stuck with the safety corps that we currently feature.

So, how to fix it?  By “hiding” the safeties in a Cover-3!

Cover-3 Theory.  If you didn’t know it before, by now you’ve realized that the number in Cover-# refers to the numbers of players in the deep zone.  It’s a handy shorthand, but it does tend to oversimplify things.  Regardless, in the Cover-3, there are (shocking!) three guys in the deep zone, with each responsible for 1/3 of the field.  But here’s the wrinkle: unlike the Cover-2, where the two deep players are safeties, the Cover-3 generally uses two corners and a safety in the deep zone.

in a standard 2-corner, 2-safety scheme, it works like this: On the snap, the FS moves toward the middle of the field.  The two corners are playing up near the line and they break back, basically running with the WRs while working back to their deep thirds.  The SS is freed to rotate into the flat, or blitz, or fill a LB zone if one of them blitzes, or any number of other things.  Also, because he’s not responsible for a deep third, the SS does not have to be able to run with deep routes or backpedal all that well, so you make up for a lack of speed/cover skills at SS.  The OLBs are responsible for the flats or hook zones, while the MLB is responsible for the intermediate middle (DeMeco would excel in this because of his sideline-to-sideline speed).  In one fell swoop, you limited what you are asking each safety to do, you’ve created a situation where DeMeco is utilized to his full ability, you’ve maximized the value of the physical corners (Robinson, Bennett, possibly Molden) because you are allowing them to jam at the line and then run with the route so they can defend the short or intermediate stuff, AND you are putting your OLBs in a position to blitz or cover the hook zone rather than try to run man-to-man with a TE.  And if you can teach him to turn his head, Reeves’ speed would be a huge asset in getting back to his deep third, so even he would be improved.

Sounds cool, no?  But here’s where it gets even better.  You can run all sorts of shapes and formations out of it.  You can disguise it as man coverage by keeping the SS back in his normal spot with the CBs in press coverage.  You can move the SS up into the box for run support or to blitz him.  You can blitz one of the OLBs and abandon the hook zone, assuming you’ll get to him before the WR gets open in the hook/short zone, or have the SS fill that hook zone and hope the QB tries to throw behind the blitz.  You can run a zone blitz in front of the Cover-3, something that would be near impossible in the Cover-2, with the DE dropping into the flat.

And there’s more—you can even change up your personnel within the scheme or the scheme within the personnel.  Because the FS is playing deep center field and ball hawking, you could occasionally put Dunta in that role, with Molden and Bennett playing jam coverage, thereby getting your big physical corners on the field at the same time while also freeing up Dunta to try to knock people out.  You could slide an athletic linebacker like Xavier Adibi into the SS role and have him up in the box doing the same thing your SS would be doing in the straight Cover-3. You can disguise the coverage and confuse the opponent by playing zone on one side while still letting Fred Bennett lock up in man coverage on the other side.  Hell, you can run the Cover-3 with your nickel package, with one corner locking up in man, one dropping into a deep third, and both safeties staying back.  (You’ll notice that ALL these iterations ask the safeties to do less than we are currently asking them to do, while attempting to create some confusion and pressure up front and maintain deep coverage across the entire deep zone.)

Now, of course, all defenses have holes and inherent weaknesses.  Cover-3 is no different.  It is particularly susceptible to short routes if the CBs are selling out to get back to their deep zones quickly.  This can be overcome somewhat by cheating out just a little bit with the OLBs and getting them into the flats more quickly.  Additionally, you can swap coverage zones every now and then—for example, have the SS retreat into the deep zone the CB rotate up into the hook/flat zone if you catch a QB trying to consistently throw underneath the retreating CB.  Even with these drawbacks and flaws, I know I would feel a lot better asking Bennett to react to a quick hitch than asking Will Demps to make an open field tackle.  (And I’m fairly confident that the 96-yarder to Calvin Johnson doesn’t happen if we are in Cover-3.)

***

Take just a second and think about this whole discussion.  You have three basic coverage philosophies here.  Your personnel is a bad fit for one, a horrible fit for one, and a pretty good fit for one.  Why in the name of Durga would the bad one and the horrible one get used extensively while the pretty good fit gets left on the bench beside your best cover corner?

The answer, best I can tell, is because Richard Smith is trying to kill me.

Professor, without knowing precisely what the danger is, would you say it’s time for our viewers to crack each other’s heads open and feast on the goo inside?

Somehow, between my switch to WordPress and my continued insistence on making up conversations, I managed to miss talking about the departure of Mike Sherman. Thankfully, the more sane among us have been all over it. Even better, in Tim’s coverage and the comments thereto, an interesting point was raised–will the departure of Sherman signal the end of the Green Bay influence on our offensive line play? More specifically, will the lack of a competing philosophy of run-blocking cause Kubiak to shift more toward a true one-cut, zone blocking running game like they use in Denver?

Before we get ahead of ourselves, however, let’s bust out the ol’ football primer, just so we are on the same page. (If you already know all this, please feel free to skip ahead to the part where it says ***STOP SKIMMING!!!***)

Not long ago, I heard a color commentator mention during an NFL game that a “zone blocking system is one in which the lineman all have a specific area they are responsible for, kind of like a zone defense in basketball.” I found the same sort of thought at Football Outsiders, too. While this is more-or-less, sorta kinda accurate when it comes to pass blocking, it is not correct vis-a-vis run blocking. Or, at least, not near correct enough to get the point across. At its most basic level, all a zone run blocking scheme means is that the offensive linemen work in pairs against two or three of the defensive linemen–i.e. the guard and center simultaneously block a defensive tackle–with one of the offensive linemen then peeling off and blocking a linebacker. The “zone” the system refers to is the part of the line where the running play is going. This is what creates the “one cut” system, but we’ll get to that in a minute.

Let’s walk through a example play where the running back is supposed to go right against a 4-3 defensive front. At the snap of the ball, the left tackle and left guard block the nose tackle, the center takes under tackle, and the right guard and right tackle block the left defensive end. This two-on-one blocking allows the offensive front to get a push and, also, to create the running lanes. Now, here’s where it gets tricky. Depending on certain factors (where the defensive player lined up, which direction the running play is going, where the linebacker is in relation to the defensive lineman, etc.), one offensive player from each double-team will disengage the defensive lineman and pick up the corresponding linebacker. So, in our example, assuming a standard 4-3 Over, the left tackle would disengage and slide to the second level to pick up the Will linebacker, the right guard would do the same and pick up the Mike linebacker, and the TE would be responsible (from the snap) for the Sam linebacker.

If this is done correctly, there should be a hole between the TE and Right Tackle, the Center and where the Right Guard was, and the Center and Left Guard. This is the “inside zone” and is where the “one cut” comes into play. In this system, the running back chooses one of these holes, makes his single cut, and goes. Ideally, he won’t make this cut until he is almost to his offensive lineman, thus allowing the defense less time to react to his angle. By contrast, the “outside zone” is the area beyond the TE/Sam block. Plays designed to seal off the defense and open up the outside zone do not have the “one cut” aspect to them–the running back is obligated to head outside (in theory, at least)–so the linemen block similar to a man blocking scheme, where there is a pre-determined hole.

***STOP SKIMMING!!!***

That’s all well and good, but how does that translate to our system? Well, as Tim correctly notes, the zone blocking scheme almost invariably features smaller, more agile offensive linemen. The reason should be obvious–it is not going to be real easy for a Larry Allen to engage a defender, then slide his big butt away from the block and pick up a linebacker who is 4 or 5 tenths of a second faster than he is. Besides, since you are hitting at the initial point of attack with a 2-on-1 advantage, you don’t need a pair of 340 lb. behemoths; a pair of 280 lb. lineman will work just fine, with the added bonus of being able to pick up linebackers and be more maneuverable in space.

And therein lies the rub. Look at our current crop of O-linemen. All are over 300 lbs. Of the opening day starters, only Eric Winston and Steve McKinney are agile enough (arguably, in McKinney’s case) to play in a zone blocking scheme. Charles Spencer–assuming he ever recovers from that injury–is far too large to play the role effectively. Of the backups, Chris White is the right size, but who knows if he is actually all that good? Kasey Studdard isn’t overly agile and he’s too heavy. And so on, and so forth.

On top of this personnel issue, there is the problem that such a scheme takes a long time to install. It’s not a plug-and-play system where you just tell the guys “ok, we’re switching to zone” and it takes care of itself. The teamwork required in knowing which blocker is to disengage and find the linebacker is not something that happens overnight. Even if you already had five offensive linemen who fit the system, it’s doubtful that such a change could be made successfully in one summer of workouts. A full summer and camp of practice would allow you to run it, but the bugs and kinks of the system would take at least a full season of play to work out. And, like I said, that is with five guys who were perfect fits.

In general, I am a fan of the zone run blocking system, if only because I feel like it’s easier to find guys who are 280-300 and somewhat agile just by culling from the college players who are “undersized” or even “too small” according to the Mel Kipers of the world. I also like the system’s emphasis on blocking through the second level instead of allowing that level to come to you. That said, I don’t know that you can slowly switch to such a system. If Kubiak and Co. decided that they wanted to run it, such a change would require dedicating much of your draft and free agent money to finding the right guys (and, thus, ignoring the glaring problems in the defensive backfield). It would also require telling guys like Fred Weary and Chester Pitts and Ephraim Salaam, “sorry, but you’re not really needed anymore.” I don’t know that our regime is willing to make such dedications and statements at this point.

Press Conference

HPD Chief Harold Hurtt: Thank you all for coming. As I’m sure you all have heard, Fred Weary has filed a suit against the City of Houston as well as the two officers who arrested him last year. Because the liberal media is sure to give Fred all the air time he desires to discuss he baseless accusations, I called this press conference to allow officers Margaret T. McGivern and Joe F. Vasquez an opportunity to present the real story. We will begin by opening the floor to questions.

Reporter 1: Officer Vasquez, you stated that Mr. Weary was driving “suspiciously.” Could you elaborate on that?

Vasquez: Well, Miss, he appeared to be Driving While Black, which, as you know, is a not-infrequent crime here in Houston. Also, he did not have a front plate on his vehicle, which I suspected to be some sort of sign to potential drug buyers that Mr. Weary was dealing crack.

Reporter 2: But was there even a need for the tasering? Mr. Weary alleges that it was unnecessary and unprovoked.

McGivern: With all due respect, ma’am, I think you lack a frame of reference here. Mr. Weary is roughly seven feet tall and close to 400 pounds. He is also black. VERY black. Standard operating procedure dictates that such a perp–that’s a technical term–should be tasered on sight.

Reporter 3: Officer Vasquez, I would like to play a portion of the audio from the dash-mounted camera on your patrol car and get your response to it.

Fred Weary: Did I do something wrong, officer?
Vasquez: GET OUT OF THE MOTHERFUCKING CAR!
Weary: Excuse me?
McGivern: YOU HEARD HIM, SHITFUCKER. GET YOUR ASS OUT OF THE CAR RIGHT NOW!! I WILL FUCKING SHOOT YOU!!!
Vasquez: SHE WILL! OH MY GOD, SHE WILL SHOOT YOU IN THE FUCKING NECK, YOU CRACKDEALER!
Weary: Chill, dude. Chill. *sounds of car door opening*
Vasquez: GET ON THE GROUND! GET ON THE GROUND NOW! YOU ARE A LARGE, BLACK MAN, SO GET ON THE DAMNED GROUND NOW!
Weary: Wha?
McGivern: LOOK OUT, I THINK HE HAS AN AK-47 IN HIS FRONT POCKET!!
Vasquez: HOLY SHIT, HE JUST MADE EYE CONTACT WITH ME. TAZE HIM! TAZE HIM!!!! *sounds of taser firing*
Weary: OW! FUCK FUCK FUCK OW!

Reporter 3: Now, upon hearing that, can you see how one might assume you overreacted?

Vasquez: Not at all. I think it is pretty clear that we were responding to both the possibility that the black man had a weapon, which most of them do, as well as the intimidating posture he was taking with me.

Reporter 2: You mean “eye contact?”

McGivern: Precisely. Also, because he was in the vicinity of the Galleria, we were afraid that some affluent white people could potentially be caught in the cross-fire if he began shooting with the weapon that we assumed he could possibly have had. It is our responsibility as peace officers to prevent such collateral damage from happening whenever possible.

Reporter 4: Chief Hurtt, does all of this sound reasonable to you? Because to the layperson, it sounds an awful lot like Mr. Weary was stopped, tasered, and arrested because he was black.

Hurtt: I am not going to dignify such a patently offensive accusation with a response. Next question.

Reporter 3: Going back to the audio excerpt for a moment, one of you stated that he possibly had “an AK-47 in his front pocket.” Is that even possible?

Vasquez: Of course it’s possible. He is very tall. Also, he’s black.

Reporter 4: So, in the end, what do you think will happen with this case?

McGivern: This is Texas. So, I assume he’ll get the chair. Though it would be a lot more certain if he were retarded.

Reporter 2: How will he get the chair for suing you?

Vasquez: We will just have to leave that up to the Texas justice system. Thank you all for coming. And GO COWBOYS!!!

‘Til you top the superbowl, keep your mouth on lock

I was going to apologize for the lack of posting around here over the past few days. Then I remembered that there is nothing to post about, so you would be getting rehashed arguments and recycled jokes.

However, now that the weekend is over and I am back at work, I have to find something to do to keep myself busy. Enter the STATS, Inc. database. My goal–to find ten stats from last season that should make us look forward to the upcoming season.

  1. Eric Winston was only charged with 2 sacks allowed last season. As a rookie. In 12 games. That’s a-nice.
  2. Of David Carr’s 140 incompletions, only 16 were due to dropped passes, while 30 were due to bad throws and 19 were hit at the line. This is one of the lowest percentage of dropped passes in the league and suggests to me that–just as we’ve all said–many of Sandy Vag’s problems were of his own making.
  3. DeMeco Ryans was eerily consistent last year. 75 tackles at home, 81 away. 73 in the first half of games, 83 in the second half. 37 on the left side of the field, 38 on the right.
  4. Andre Johnson caught 62.8% of the balls thrown at him. By way of comparison, Marvin Harrison caught 64.2%, Torry Holt caught 52%, and Chad Johnson caught 57.2%. Now, granted, all of them had a higher first down percentage, but that should come up for Andre as the offense becomes accustomed to a QB who actually looks downfield.
  5. Morlon Greenwood was noticeably better in the second half of the season, posting 66 of his 110 tackles, all of his FFs and PDs, and his lone INT. He’s also Jamaican, which cracks me up for some reason.
  6. Owen Daniels owned the Titans, going off for 11 catches, 124 yds, and 2 TDs against them. (That’s “owned” by TE standards.) I’m setting his over/under against them this year at 16 catches.
  7. Fred Weary had only 4 penalties and 3 sacks allowed. Combine that with Eric Winston’s production and I think it’s fair to say our right said could be one of the best in football this year. Fred also enjoys swingers clubs, which is both hilarious and frightening.
  8. Ahman Green averaged 5.4 YPC against the AFC last season, compared to 3.5 against the NFC. Now, he gets to rush against the Titans and Colts twice instead of the Vikings and Bears twice. That is a good thing.
  9. Anthony Maddox was statistically almost twice as good in December as he was in October. Instead of struggling to get into football shape, he seemingly became stronger and better each week.
  10. Sage Rosenfels was sacked once in 40 attempts. I’m pretty sure he was playing with the same line the other QB was. Just sayin’.

T-minus 10 days until camp. (I feel like a little kid at Christmas. But without the fear that I will again walk in on my mom tongue-bathing Santa.)

LenDalesaurus would make the All-Gastronomical Team

Random Thought: Who are the best players at each position in the AFC South? I’m not talking so much about career stats or even what they did last year, though the latter will play into it a little. Rather, if you could build a team right now, to start play in 2007 (without worrying about nastiness like the salary cap), what would an All-AFC South starting lineup look like?

Offense
QB–Peyton Manning. Mrs. Chesney is the only correct answer here. Damn it.
RB–Maurice Jones-Drew. Joseph Addai was a tempting choice, but Jones-Drew’s combination of game breaking speed and strength makes me lean this way. Besides, he averaged more yards per carry than Addai last season and had nearly twice as many TDs.
FB–Vonta Leach. Funny thing… not too many teams in this division use a true fullback. Sure, Dallas Clark lines up as an H-back sometimes, but that’s not the same. So I chose Leach over Ahmard Hall, thinking that there must have been a reason the Giants were trying to snag Leach away.
WR1–Andre Johnson. Blasphemer! Heretic! Possibly, but I think that this is the season where Andre Johnson establishes himself as the best WR in the conference. His numbers might not trump Harrison’s, but his play will.
WR2–Marvin Harrison. It’s not like I left Marvin off the list. We can even call him WR1B if that makes certain fans happy.
TE–Owen Daniels. I hadn’t stopped to think about how solid the TEs are throughout the AFC South. Besides Daniels and the aforementioned Clark, you’ve got Marcedes Lewis, Bo Scaife, Ben Troupe, etc. Daniels, however, showed signs of a breakout last year, so consider this almost as much prognostication as reasoned choice.
LT–Tarik Glenn. Put it this way–it is my fond hope that, someday, Charles Spencer is as good as Glenn.
LG–Vince Manuwai. Umm… you ever tried to pick the best left guard out of a group?
C–Jeff Saturday. Even Colts fans acknowledge that Saturday is a big reason for the Colts’ success. He’s still one of the best in all of football.
RG–Chris Naeole. God, I hate picking guards. That said, Naeole is every bit as good as Fred Weary and 1/10th as likely to get tazered. That counts in this. Somehow.
RT–Eric Winston. Winston would be being groomed to start (or actually starting) at left tackle for a number of teams in the NFL. I honestly think he’ll be one of the best RTs in the league this season.

Defense
LDE–Kyle Vanden Bosch. The funny thing about the defensive line in this exercise is that all of the choices were pretty clear cut. With the next three guys on the list, it is because they are among the very best at their respective positions in the entire league. With KVB, however, it’s because the rest of the choices in the conference were uninspiring. Congrats, Kyle.
LDT–Marcus Stroud. Stroud and Henderson were taken in the first round by the Jags in consecutive drafts. Since then, they’ve dominated nearly everyone they’ve played and show no signs of slowing down.
RDT–John Henderson. Asked and answered, your honor.
RDE–Dwight Freeney. I like Mario Williams as much or more than pretty much anyone. That said, I would trade him for Freeney in a heartbeat. And there aren’t too many fans of other teams who wouldn’t swap their RDE for him.
LLB–David Thornton. Looking at the Titans’ depth chart, you see two tackling machines on either side of a complete turd. Odd. Thornton showed great all-around strongside play last year and, with some of the glaring holes the Titans have on D this year, he’ll be asked to play that well again.
MLB–DeMeco Ryans. D-e-M-e-c-o. 125 solo tackles, 3.5 sacks, 1 INT, and 5 passes defended. As a rookie. (Here’s where I wish I could have the Kool-Aid Man bust through your screen and scream “Oh, YEAH!”)
RLB–Keith Bulluck. Five straight seasons over 100 tackles, and he’s still one of the most underrated players in the league. Hard to do.
CB1–Rashean Mathis. Class of the AFC South CBs, Mathis is a ball hawk and–like Bulluck–not near as heralded out of conference as he should be.
CB2–Dunta Robinson. I did the same thing with CB that I did with WR–I put the second-best #1 in the #2 spot. Now, I know that Friend-of-DGDB&D KC Joyner said that Dunta wasn’t quite as good as advertised, but he also said that last year’s metrics suggested he was improving. So, I’m going on the assumption that he will be better this year than any CB in the South other than Mathis.
SS–Chris Hope. Great in coverage, great nose for the ball, fantastic tackler, integral part of a Super Bowl defense.
FS–Bob Sanders. Remember that scene in Friday, where Deebo hit Red? Yeah, that’s what it’s like when Sanders unloads on an unsuspecting WR. Of course, he’s not the most durable dude in the league, but–for this team–he’s just the type of physical presence you want.

Mark Bruener rolls his hips like Shakira

It is not every day1 that a Texans player is held out as the archetype for his position. At one point, long before he wore Battle Red, I suppose Tony Boselli was the prototypical left tackle. But that was many years and many steroid-related injuries ago. So, when I found this little nugget within a breakdown of NFL TE scouting, I just had to pass it along.

Run Blocking: Run blocking is where tight ends earn their paychecks. Most people look at the red-zone touchdowns as the role of a tight end, but the majority of NFL offenses still teach run blocking over route running. The tight end is the catalyst for most off-tackle and outside runs. Depending on the play called and the blocking scheme, the tight end can be one of the most important people on the field. Run blocking is an unquestioned skill that every tight end must possess or learn immediately. Being an effective run blocker is what keeps most rookies off the field.

Scouting Points: Just as there were a few techniques to look at with pass blocking, there are some with run blocking. I won’t get into steps as much here, but some things to look for follow. The tight end needs to be the first man off the line of scrimmage on every play. He must anticipate the snap count and fire off into his man. Once he has made contact, the blocker must get inside leverage (on the chest plate in most cases) and drive his man in the direction the play calls for. This is where lower-body strength comes into play. The tight end must be strong enough to use his butt and legs to drive the defender. The blocker will take short, choppy steps in an effort to move the defender. This is where the term “rolling your hips” comes from. The blocker should be rolling through his defender by using his legs to drive block.

Pro Standard: Mark Bruener, Houston Texans

I don’t know this Matt Miller fella from Adam, so I am completely unaware as to his credentials when it comes to scouting anything. Regardless, I always enjoy seeing a Texan held out as an example of anything good. I mean, Fred Weary might be the most giving swinger at the club, but that’s not exactly the type of stuff that translates to the football field; being a very good run blocker obviously does.

1 This is what the kids call “an understatement.”

Sam Gado prescribes nine wins to cure what ails us

This morning, I offer three nuggets of Texans corn wedged into the turd that is the internet.

Samkon Gado is going to miss some practices to finish studying for the MCAT. In a league where some people can’t spell MCAT, Gado has not given up on his goal of becoming Dr. Sam, MD.


Gado missed a handful of the workouts last month but is back in Houston and has returned to practice. He’ll take the test July 15.

Kubiak wasn’t worried about Gado missing the time for such a good reason. “He’s an impressive human being,” Kubiak said. “He’s got his stuff together, and he’ll be fine.”

He first took the test two years ago but decided to take it again to try to improve his score before applying to medical school. He enrolled in a class in South Carolina.

This is cool. I have nothing much to add to it, I guess, but it is still cool. Good luck, Sammy-kon.

Fred Weary may be under investigation for beating someone down in a nightclub and for allegedly going all Ike Turner on his wife, but Kubiak does not seem overly interested in the hub-bub. Kubes said the whole thing was a” family matter.” Whatever. What interested me about this article was this line:

Weary has not been charged with the incident that erupted last week at a Houston swingers club. (emphasis added)

“Hi, my wife and I were looking at you and we wondered if you would like to join me? She would like to meet your husband, too. [Fred walks in, buck naked] OH GOOD GOD, WHAT IS THAT?!?!?!?! [woman faints, man weeps]“

Finally, in a move that has to make one wonder how sold the staff is on Kevin Walters, the team is auditioning Kennan McCardell today. Granted, KMc has not cracked 1000 yards since 2003. Also granted, he is 37. However, unlike a certain act of desperation on the part of a certain Tennessee-based NFL team, this move makes some sense. You bring in McCardell, see if he still has enough straight-line speed to stretch the field and make life easier for Andre, and then you decide if he is worth signing at his asking price. There is none of the Keyshawn “I’m still the greatest, I ain’t playing for less than ONE BILLION DOLLARS” situation involved here, at least that I can see. I may not be thrilled about the move–remember, I am still in JJ’s camp–but I can see the motivation behind it.

Fred Weary aspires to be Pacman Jones

It appears that starting Right Guard Fred Weary was involved in some sort of skirmish at a nightclub last Tuesday night. The club owner decided not to press charges after Fred paid for whatever damage was caused, but there is an investigation ongoing because of some possible assault charges.

I don’t really have much to add to this story until I hear more. But… um… I can think of a WHOLE lot of players I’d pick a fight with before 6′4″/308 Fred Weary.