Kickoff - “Total Randomness” Edition
Oct 23, 2008 H/T Eric, I was told there would be no math, Kickoff, Non-Texan stuff, Stats
On offense. Hooston Texan over at Texans Talk has a nice breakdown of how our offense is scoring, scoring well, and scoring without much help on the other side of the ball. An excerpt:
Our offense is getting next to no help from the defense and special teams in getting points. In my research, I looked at the scoring drives for the 22 teams that totaled more than 124 points (obviously, the other 9 could not have more “unassisted” points if they had fewer than 124 total points), and every one of those teams had at least 13 more “assisted” points than we have. Except one: Dallas also had only 16. Imagine how many more points we would have scored with an occasional turnover or long return. Ugh.
In other news, the sky is blue. Following up on last night’s Owen “Elvis” Daniels post, here’s something from the mothership about how Daniels really is becoming one of the best TEs in football. As if you didn’t already know that.
I’m not leaving ’til I get my stuff! Marroncito is giving away free tickets to this weekend’s game. All you have to do is bare a little bit of your soul.
Finally. Unrelated to football, but Dave and Lee have moved up to the big time. The Dream Shake is now a part of SBN. 1. Move to SBN. 2. ????. 3. Profit!
Richard Smith and the Mystery of Pass Coverage
Oct 22, 2008 Drunky Drunkerton, Duane Brown as Eliza Doolittle, Dunta Robinson, Faggination, Fire Richard Smith, Fisted by Jessica Alba, Football 101, Fred Weary is dirty, I was told there would be no math, Rendhel and Sid, Richard Justice is a talentless hack., The Fred, Theft
If you have read any of the previous Xs/Os things here at DGDB&D, it should be pretty clear that I am defense-first kind of guy. For every one article on zone blocking, there are at least four on some aspect of our defense or lack thereof. It’s not that I don’t like offense, but given the choice I’d prefer to see Mario Williams knock someone unconscious than watch Owen Daniels get a first down. I’m just odd, I s’pose.
Anyway, because I’m a defensive guy, watching Richard Smith’s approach to my favorite side of the ball has been especially painful. Whether it’s repeatedly dropping Mario into coverage against a Tennessee team that didn’t really throw into the flat all day or benching his best cornerback in favor of someone who is in the conversation for worst player in the NFL, Smith consistently does everything wrong—and, conversely, nothing right—in his defensive playcalling. We’ve covered the lack of blitzing and general lack of common sense and even offered up a possible solution (that Smith would never apply because it takes courage and vision).
The one thing we haven’t really covered, however, except in post-game griping and general comments about defensive failure, is our pass-coverage philosophy. Yet, after seeing the predictable result of Petey Faggins one-on-one with a WR that only Nnamdi Asomugah could cover, I think it’s about time to tackle the defensive backfield. I hope to tackle it better than Will Demps is tackling right now.
First, some background. The Texans play a mix of man coverage (usually in the form of Cover-1 or Cover-2 Man) and Cover-2 zone. Just so we are all on the same page, let’s look at each of those schemes. (Note: as always, we are talking in generalizations here. There are a million tiny variations to all of these…none of which Richard Smith understands.)
Man/Cover-1 Theory. Our most common form of man coverage is the Cover-1. (Our second-most common form is the Cover-2 Man, but we’ll hit on that in a minute.) In Cover-1, the defense has one deep defender at or near the middle of the field (relative to the sidelines) and he is responsible for deep help. Underneath, you will generally have pure man coverage from your CBs and LBs, with the other safety—usually the SS—free to assist in man coverage, sneak up for run support, or blitz.
If you are paying attention, you can see the biggest flaw in the Cover-1: the deep safety is responsible for a TON of real estate and if he lacks the speed or guesses wrong on where to go, it is almost impossible for him to recover. Thus a Cover-1 requires a very good FS in the deep coverage.
Under Gregg Williams, the Redskins ran a Cover-1 as a base package quite a bit, with the thinking being that Sean Taylor was more than capable of playing the role. He was, but Williams continually failed to realize that the scheme put a tremendous amount of pressure on his corners—because they absolutely had to avoid getting burned deep—and they were most certainly not up to that task. Nevertheless, Williams’ reputation as an aggressive play-caller—a myth that we already addressed before the season—was due in large part to the Cover-1’s requirements.
What I mean by this is, because of the inherent flaw in Cover-1, teams that employ that coverage try to be more aggressive up front to prevent the opponent from having enough time to stretch the field and develop multiple deep routes, thereby protecting the safety. To do this, the Cover-1 attempts to employ many different blitz packages/man assigments, most of which revolve around bringing the SS up to LB depth and, from here, either blitzing him or blitzing a LB or CB with that safety picking up the appropriate receiver. For this to be effective, however, any non-blitzing CBs/LBs (especially the WLB) have to be able to cover until the pressure gets to the QB.
Cover-1 also suffers from plenty of room after the catch, as most or all of the underneath defenders are locked up in man coverage of their own and, should a WR catch the ball, are not in position to make a quick tackle. (Think Greg Camarillo on a slant.)
Why it doesn’t work for the Texans. I think you see where I am going with this. Basically, in this coverage, you are asking Will Demps to cover sideline to sideline, Brandon Harrison (or, prior, C.N. Brown) to lock up in man coverage, and Petey Faggins and Jacques Reeves to maintain tight man coverage until Richard Smith’s non-effective blitz package gets to the QB. It should come as no surprise that, in the aforementioned Immolation Of The Faggins looked to be in Cover-1. [EDIT: Triple347 says the Johnson completion was in quarter-quarter-half coverage. See comments for discussion.
Even worse, though, is that Smith bastardizes the hell out of his Cover-1. Far be it from him to send the SS on a blitz. No, he utilizes the SS almost entirely in pass coverage from the LB depth. Meaning that teams with even two games worth of film on the Texans' D quickly figure out that the SS is bluffing and, thus, they don't try to account for him in blitz pickup. Instead, they take advantage of the fact that our SSs don't backpedal all that well---most don't---and they abuse him in coverage or throw over the top of him if he is dropping back into a middle zone.
When Brown/Harrison aren't all the way up at LB depth, Smith sneaks the up toward the middle of the field and in behind DeMeco Ryans, almost as if they are playing some kind of non-commital run support. Behind our best tackler. Because he apparently needs the backup?
Cover-2/Cover-2 Man. "Cover-2" might be the most overused and misunderstood phrase in football defense today. Pretty much all teams will occasionally come out in something resembling a Cover-2, but most have a wrinkle of some sort because most lack the personnel to effectively run a true Cover-2.
Cover-2 is a 2-deep, 5-under zone system. In this coverage, both safeties are responsible for half of the deep part of the field. The CBs are in press coverage and are each responsible for 1/5th of the short/intermediate zone underneath the two safeties. The three linebackers are each responsible for another 1/5. Because the safeties will generally line up between their respective hashmark and the sideline and because they will work toward the sideline at the snap, the biggest hole in the Cover-2 coverage is in between them, behind the MLB.
[Quick side-note: The Tampa-2 variant drops the MLB into deeper coverage to address the hole in the straight Cover-2 and has the CBs/remaining LBs responsible for 1/4th of the field each.]
Whereas the Cover-1 attempts to be aggressive up front to prevent the big play, the Cover-2 typically uses just the four-man rush and attempts to take away the big play by going into a bend-don’t-break mode. There are holes in the coverage between the zones, so teams will tend to throw underneath the two safeties, which is just what the defense is encouraging.
In Cover-2 Man, the safeties still play the same way, but the coverage underneath is pure man. The safeties help with deep coverage into their zones, but the man coverage will stay with the receivers through those zones as well, effectively leading to double-coverage on deep routes.
Regardless of whether the team is in Cover-2 or Cover-2 Man, the one place they should never, ever get beat deep is on the sidelines. The CBs have the WRs through the intermediate zone and the safeties, who moved toward the sideline at the snap, pick them up as they get deeper. Assuming your safeties can do that (and that your CBs consider basic things like “turn your head” and “don’t get roasted off the line”), the Cover-2 allows you to force teams to throw short-to-intermediate passes toward the middle of the field (thereby giving you the added benefit of forcing the opposition to throw the ball past many more hands), with the safeties coming up to make quick tackles. Of course, that also requires that you have safeties that tackle well…
Why this doesn’t work for the Texans. Again, I think you see where this is headed. The corners that Smith insists on giving the most reps are incapable of defending balls thrown over the top of them. The safeties seem incapable of giving help in the intermediate zone or in picking up WRs as they come into the deep zone. Will Demps especially has the annoying habit of letting the WR coming into his zone get past him before he reacts.
It is telling that we are CONSISTENTLY beat along the sidelines at every depth. The basic tenets of this coverage require that you have safeties who can defend the go/corner routes, not let WRs get behind them, and, most importantly, don’t get so worried about the underneath stuff that you bite on double-move. Simply put, we don’t have that.
****
You see the most glaring common weakness through the whole discussion as it pertains to us? OUR SAFETIES ARE NOT GOOD ENOUGH TO RUN ANY OF THE COVERAGES WE ARE ASKING THEM TO RUN. Oh, sure, our Faggins and Reeves are very bad and they deserve their fair share of the blame—blame I am more than happy to heap on Petey at every opportunity—but at least we have Dunta Robinson, Fred Bennett, and Antwaun Molden available. Cornerback could theoretically be fixed if the DC would use some common sense. But we are stuck with the safety corps that we currently feature.
So, how to fix it? By “hiding” the safeties in a Cover-3!
Cover-3 Theory. If you didn’t know it before, by now you’ve realized that the number in Cover-# refers to the numbers of players in the deep zone. It’s a handy shorthand, but it does tend to oversimplify things. Regardless, in the Cover-3, there are (shocking!) three guys in the deep zone, with each responsible for 1/3 of the field. But here’s the wrinkle: unlike the Cover-2, where the two deep players are safeties, the Cover-3 generally uses two corners and a safety in the deep zone.
in a standard 2-corner, 2-safety scheme, it works like this: On the snap, the FS moves toward the middle of the field. The two corners are playing up near the line and they break back, basically running with the WRs while working back to their deep thirds. The SS is freed to rotate into the flat, or blitz, or fill a LB zone if one of them blitzes, or any number of other things. Also, because he’s not responsible for a deep third, the SS does not have to be able to run with deep routes or backpedal all that well, so you make up for a lack of speed/cover skills at SS. The OLBs are responsible for the flats or hook zones, while the MLB is responsible for the intermediate middle (DeMeco would excel in this because of his sideline-to-sideline speed). In one fell swoop, you limited what you are asking each safety to do, you’ve created a situation where DeMeco is utilized to his full ability, you’ve maximized the value of the physical corners (Robinson, Bennett, possibly Molden) because you are allowing them to jam at the line and then run with the route so they can defend the short or intermediate stuff, AND you are putting your OLBs in a position to blitz or cover the hook zone rather than try to run man-to-man with a TE. And if you can teach him to turn his head, Reeves’ speed would be a huge asset in getting back to his deep third, so even he would be improved.
Sounds cool, no? But here’s where it gets even better. You can run all sorts of shapes and formations out of it. You can disguise it as man coverage by keeping the SS back in his normal spot with the CBs in press coverage. You can move the SS up into the box for run support or to blitz him. You can blitz one of the OLBs and abandon the hook zone, assuming you’ll get to him before the WR gets open in the hook/short zone, or have the SS fill that hook zone and hope the QB tries to throw behind the blitz. You can run a zone blitz in front of the Cover-3, something that would be near impossible in the Cover-2, with the DE dropping into the flat.
And there’s more—you can even change up your personnel within the scheme or the scheme within the personnel. Because the FS is playing deep center field and ball hawking, you could occasionally put Dunta in that role, with Molden and Bennett playing jam coverage, thereby getting your big physical corners on the field at the same time while also freeing up Dunta to try to knock people out. You could slide an athletic linebacker like Xavier Adibi into the SS role and have him up in the box doing the same thing your SS would be doing in the straight Cover-3. You can disguise the coverage and confuse the opponent by playing zone on one side while still letting Fred Bennett lock up in man coverage on the other side. Hell, you can run the Cover-3 with your nickel package, with one corner locking up in man, one dropping into a deep third, and both safeties staying back. (You’ll notice that ALL these iterations ask the safeties to do less than we are currently asking them to do, while attempting to create some confusion and pressure up front and maintain deep coverage across the entire deep zone.)
Now, of course, all defenses have holes and inherent weaknesses. Cover-3 is no different. It is particularly susceptible to short routes if the CBs are selling out to get back to their deep zones quickly. This can be overcome somewhat by cheating out just a little bit with the OLBs and getting them into the flats more quickly. Additionally, you can swap coverage zones every now and then—for example, have the SS retreat into the deep zone the CB rotate up into the hook/flat zone if you catch a QB trying to consistently throw underneath the retreating CB. Even with these drawbacks and flaws, I know I would feel a lot better asking Bennett to react to a quick hitch than asking Will Demps to make an open field tackle. (And I’m fairly confident that the 96-yarder to Calvin Johnson doesn’t happen if we are in Cover-3.)
***
Take just a second and think about this whole discussion. You have three basic coverage philosophies here. Your personnel is a bad fit for one, a horrible fit for one, and a pretty good fit for one. Why in the name of Durga would the bad one and the horrible one get used extensively while the pretty good fit gets left on the bench beside your best cover corner?
The answer, best I can tell, is because Richard Smith is trying to kill me.
For Entertainment Purposes Only. *wink wink, nudge nudge*
Oct 9, 2008 2008 Season, I was told there would be no math, Teams that aren't the Texans
Courtesy of an email I just got from Bodog, here are some random NFL odds for your Thursday afternoon perusal.
Miscellaneous Odds
Who will be the last NFL team to win a game?
Houston Texans 6/1
Cincinnati Bengals 9/4
Detroit Lions 2/1
St Louis Rams 3/2How many offensive turnovers will the Washington Redskins commit in the 2008 NFL season?
Over/Under 13.5
Brett Favre week 6 Touchdown Passes
Over 2.5 +185
Under 2.5 -245How many starts will Drew Stanton get in the 2008 NFL season?
Over 1.5 Even
Under 1.5 -130In week 6 the Philadelphia Eagles will score more points in the first half/second half?
First half -200
Second Half +150In week 6 the San Diego Chargers will score more points in the first half/second half?
First Half +150
Second Half -200Who will have more rushing yards from week 6 till the end of the season for the Cincinnati Bengals?
Chris Perry -155
Cedric Benson +115Who will lead the NE Patriots in rushing for the rest of the 2008 NFL season?
Sammy Morris +125
LaMont Jordan +220
Laurence Maroney +160Plaxico Burress Week 6 Receiving Yards
Over/Under 60.5
Updated Playoff Odds
Will the Green Bay Packers make the playoffs?
Yes +340
No -440Will the Indianapolis Colts make the playoffs?
Yes +160
No -210Will the Jacksonville Jaguars make the playoffs?
Yes +400
No -600Will the Minnesota Vikings make the playoffs?
Yes +120
No -160Will the New Orleans Saints make the playoffs?
Yes +375
No -465Will the Philadelphia Eagles make the playoffs?
Yes +1400
No -2000Will the San Diego Chargers make the playoffs?
Yes Even
No -135Will the Seattle Seahawks make the playoffs?
Yes +400
No -600
DGDB&D Guest Post feat. Vega
Sep 24, 2008 Conventional Wisdom Can Blow Me, Curious Coaching, Gary Kubiak might be high, Guest Posts, I really dig my readers, I was told there would be no math
Because he was the only other person besides myself that I saw arguing that Kubiak’s fourth-down plays were statistically correct, I asked math dork guru Vega to run the numbers for a guest post. Enjoy.
70% of Statistics are Made Up on the Spot
by: Vega
Last week, Gary Kubiak went for it on fourth down six times in the game against the BE-SF’s. SIX!! Who the fuck does that?! Did he have a meth-contact high? Probably. But I think that accounts more for his play calling and challenges than it did for his fourth down decisions.
Kubiak actually played the percentages pretty well on those situations. Yeah, I know we still lost. Yeah, I know we only made 2 of those 6 (33%). But that’s the thing about percentages. There’s always that chance you’ll get fucked. The idea is to increase the probability that you fuck someone else, because we all know it’s better to fuck than be fucked. [Ed. note: Not according to Foomey.] Simply put, that’s really the coach’s only job.
We’ve all heard about the fact that coaches are as a whole more conservative on 4th down than they statistically should be, but what does that really mean? The original line of thinking on fourth down conversions vs. field goals comes from this paper from Economics Professor David Romer from the University of Cal–Berkley. He used economic models of expected returns to see if coaches were really maximizing their probability of winning. If you’re not into busting your brain on math with no numbers, let me give you the super simplified version.
Romer starts by assigning a value to field position. Basically, he assigns expected points based on the long term expected return of having first and ten from every yard line minus the value of where you would leave your opponent. For example, having first and ten from your own one is worth -1.6 points because you’re unlikely to score many points, but you’re likely to leave your opponent with good field position.
He then estimated the value of kicks at every point on the field by taking the expected point return on a field goal minus the value of average field position on the ensuing kickoff. For punts he took the value of the average field position of where you would leave your opponent. Finally, he looked at fourth down conversion probabilities for 4th and 1, 4th and 2, all the way to 4th and 10, at every yard line (technically he used 3rd down stats because there wasn’t enough data on 4th downs, but it works pretty well).
When the dust settled, Romer had developed a method where you can look at fourth and whatever from any point on the field and determine your expected point return by either going for it or kicking. He was then nice enough to plot this on a chart so you can just look at it and see what you should do (statistically speaking). Easy peasy, Japanesy.
Now let’s take a look at the six occasions where Kubiak went for it.
|
Situation |
Romer Says… |
Result |
|
4th and 1 from Tenn 11; 9:58 2nd Q |
Go for it! |
Slaton 6 yard rush. Good! |
|
4th and 4 from Tenn 10; 5:20 3rd Q |
It’s close, but go for it* |
1 yard pass to Slaton. Bad. |
|
4th and 3 from Tenn 17; 9:11 4th Q |
It’s close, but go for it* |
13 yard pass to Johnson. Good! |
|
4th and 2 from Tenn 2; 7:12 4th Q |
Go for it! |
Slaton rush for 1 yard. Bad. |
|
4th and 10 from Tenn 48; 4:26 4th Q |
Kick |
Pass intercepted. Bad |
|
4th and 10 from Tenn 48; 1:17 4th Q |
Kick |
Pass intercepted. Bad |
* Within standard error, so there is no definitive answer, but it is on the “Go for it” side.
So it looks like with the exception of the last two, Kubiak made the statistically rational decision four out of six times. Ah, if only it were that simple.
For the sake of simplicity, the study was done with data independent of game situations. In other words, it didn’t take into consideration the score, time left on the clock, quality of the teams, etc. So let’s look at each of these a little bit closer.
· 4th and 1 from Tenn 11; 9:58 2nd Q: Romer says to go for it. At this point, there was plenty of time left in the game so we can take Romer’s recommendation at face value. Good call.
· 4th and 4 from Tenn 10; 5:20 3rd Q: This one is close. According to Romer, when a call is right on the boundary, the team should be fairly indifferent to going for it vs. kicking, so you should really play the game situation. I can see the argument against Kubiak as a FG would have made the score 24-15 with over a quarter left to play. Remember that if we kick the FG, Tenn probably ends up with the ball at the 27, so we in essence reduce our probability of getting the ball back with the same score. Still, considering Tennessee had started going with the “let’s just not fuck up” game plan and we would leave them field position worth about -1, so we stand a good chance of getting the ball back with good field position. Hold on… I have a headache… All in all, both the score and the game situation slightly lean towards going for it, so I say go for it.
· 4th and 3 from Tenn 17; 9:11 4th Q: Again, this one is close so we need to consider the game situation. Down twelve with 9 minutes left. Kick a FG and we need another FG and a TD to win. If we miss, we need two TDs. The argument for conservatism is a little stronger here as the game situation starts to become more important than the statistical analysis. The problem here though is that we had 2nd and 3. We ran it left for two yards on second down and then threw to Slaton in the flat on 3rd for a loss of two. Way to push the ball down field guys.
· 4th and 2 from Tenn 2; 7:12 4th Q: Ok, this one is a no brainer. The stats say go and the game situation says go. That said, I’d like to send a big “Fuck You” to Kubes on the play calling again. Let’s look at the prior plays.
o 1st and 4 from the 4: Run Slaton right end for three yards.
o 2nd and 1 from the 1: Incomplete pass to a well covered Apostrophe. That’s a timing route that wasn’t even close. With that coverage, Schaub should have either floated one to the corner or looked for another receiver. That’s fucking crazy talk!
o 3rd and 1 from the 1: Pass to Kevin Walter for -1 yard. Yeah, because when I have one yard to go against a super aggressive defense, I don’t even like to look at the endzone.
o 4th and 2 from the 2: Run Slaton up the middle against the strength of the defense. Look, Slaton had a great game, but most of that success was to the left and to a lesser extent to the right; NOT up the middle where our Oline was getting dominated. Throughout the game, Slaton had one rush up the middle that gained more than one yard and that was to close out the first half.
· 4th and 10 from Tenn 48; 4:26 4th Q: Romer says kick, but I think we’ve gotten to that point in the game where you’re willing to take on more risk because of the game situation. Down 12 with less than five minutes left, you have to go for it. Again though, the big problem here is if you look at the prior downs. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd downs were incompletions.
· 4th and 10 from Tenn 48; 1:17 4th Q: Same as before. Stats say kick, but who gives a fuck. You HAVE to go for this. The pick was not really Schaub’s fault as Vanden Bosch was given the red carpet treatment on his way to Schaub’s knee. But again, we had 2nd and 3 from the 4 and ran at Haynesworth and VB. We then took a sack on third down to put ourselves in this spot.
To sum this all up, it doesn’t look like we made the bad decision to go for it on fourth down on these plays, but where we fucked up was in putting ourselves in too many fourth downs. This came from weak play calling and poor execution. So while some may say that one of our problems last week came from being too aggressive on fourth down, I would argue that we weren’t aggressive enough on first second and third downs and ended up in too many fourth down situations.
Let me leave you with this.
We were first and goal from inside the 10 three times, and first and 10 from the 11 once more. Three of those times we ended up with a fourth down situation. That’s why we lost the game.
Random Thought
Sep 4, 2008 I was told there would be no math, Random Thoughts with Matt, Teams that aren't the Texans, Vince Young can't read this post
(<–click that pic for bonus fun!)
There are a number of similarities between the Vikings and the BESFs (good running game, stout defense led by the front four, no WRs to speak of, mustachioed head coaches…). Yet, the common refrain when discussing the Vikings is “the running game is awesome, the defense is really good…if ONLY they had a QB, I’d pick them to go all the way!”
Well, consider:
T. Jackson—DYAR 105 (26th out of 41 QBs), DVOA -5.8% (28th/41), 9 TD, 12 INT
V. Young—-DYAR 74 (28th/41), DVOA -8.4 (31st/41), 9 TD, 17 INT
[Note: This will be the last dig based on last year's stats that I will probably get in on VY before the season starts. Thankfully, I have no concerns that he will supply me with more ammo as 2008 progresses.]
Run, fool!
Aug 5, 2008 2007 Season, Huh?, I was told there would be no math, Stats
So, I was killing time just a few minutes ago and I started looking at random Texans’ stats. Get this:
When the Texans rushed to the left last year, which they did 91 times, they averaged 3.7/carry.
When the Texans rushed up the middle, which they did 114 times, they averaged 3.7/carry.
But, when the Texans rushed to the right, which they did only 42 times, they averaged 5.1/carry.
OK…sure…you generally expect that a team will do a little better running to the strong side. That makes sense, right? But here’s where it gets weird. The left-run average? 25th in the league. The middle-run avearge? 4th in the league. The right-run average? 11th in the league.
What does all this mean? I dunno. Nada, I suppose. It just struck me as note-worthy that our much-maligned running game was actually well above average on 156 of our 247 carries. (Here is where one of the 50 engineers who reads this blog should chime in with some better analysis. Lawyers don’t do math. Well, other than grungedave, but he’s odd.)
Bad Would Be An Upgrade
Aug 4, 2008 2006 Draft, Hype, I was told there would be no math, Overrated, Reggie Bush, Stats, Tremendous Busts
Courtesy of Dave, we get the following tidbit from Fatty Starbucks about everyone’s favorite punt returner:
Saturday, July 26, New Orleans Saints camp
JACKSON, Miss. — “When you look at your first two years and you see the 3.8 yards per carry, do you want to puke?” I asked Reggie Bush, who was sitting on a golf cart on the running track surrounding the football field at Millsaps College.
Bush smiled. “Well, kind of. I want nine, 10 yards a carry. But I think the difference with me this year is I’m smarter. I realize four yards is a good run sometimes. I appreciate four yards; I’m not disappointed when I get stopped after four yards.”
I have heard this before. This is what the Saints were saying going into the 2007 season, and Bush wasn’t any more explosive in his second year. The difference this year, the Saints hope, is Bush was a workout fanatic around the New Orleans complex in the offseason, with lots of the strong-burst lifting (squats, mostly) that give a back the kind of explosion through holes we haven’t seen enough of in Bush. He’s most certainly on trial, and he feels it.
“What I did in college was not a fluke,” he said. “And the NFL will not be a fluke for me either.”
OK, first things first, the article already gives Bush too much credit: he has only averaged 3.7/carry over his career, not the 3.8 the author generously gives him. Second, being “not disappointed” after you get stopped for four yards isn’t really the best outlook a guy can have, especially when the rumor is that he is too soft to be a real running back. After all, Ron “Meringue” Dayne averaged 4.0/carry last year and I wouldn’t go so far as to say I was thrilled with the guy.
Now, yes, I realize that Reggie is actually saying something along the lines of “if I can always get four and then get more than that from time to time, I’ll be happy.” Fine. Whatever. But here’s the rub: there is NOTHING to suggest that Bush is even capable of getting to that level.
In fact, let’s take it one step further. Let’s get crazy. Let’s throw this statement out there and see if it floats:
Reggie Bush is an offensive liability
There. I said it. What? You want proof? Fine. First, some numbers, as compiled by the inimitable bfd:
Basically, every time Bush touches the ball, he is hurting his team. The only exception to this rule was as a receiver in 2006 where his 8.4 yards/catch was higher than other Saints backs. In other words, Bush is an offensive sinkhole.
In 2006, his 3.6 yards/rush was below that of the team without him. In addition, most of his 2006 numbers are skewed by a single game against the Giants that single-handedly raises his yards/rush by nearly .5 yards for the entire season.
In 2007, both his yards/rush and yards/catch were well below that of the rest of the Saints’ RBs. Only Mike Karney and Drew Brees, with their 34 combined rushes, managed worse rushing totals. On the receiving side, even Karney’s 6.0 yards/reception were better than Bush’s horrific 5.7 yards/catch. In fact, Bush’s yards/catch of 5.7 was third worst in the league, but he received the ball as many times as the two people below him, Willis McGahee and Ryan Grant, combined.
Bush’s 3.7 yards/rush in 2007 ranks him 38th out of 49 qualifiers, but considering that Aaron Stecker and Pierre Thomas both had more yards/rush more than Bush, Bush’s poor numbers are a likely function of his suckiness moreso than issues with the line. (On the other hand, Adrian Peterson and Ced Benson ranked 46 and 47, respectively, which means that there was probably something more than just the RB that was impacting the rushing equation in Chicago.)
Then, one must consider from where Bush is scoring. Of Bush’s 10 rushing touchdowns, six have been from one yard out, and only 10 and 15 yard rushes—the latter being his longest—are even in double-digit yards. Bush has four receiving touchdowns, only one of which is longer than five yards—his 61-yarder that got endless, unnecessary replays. As a running back, Bush is showing all the explosiveness of Tom Rathman. Which is to say, none.
If Bush isn’t the worst RB in the league, his only real competition is Cedric Benson, but that could also be a matter of offensive line play. When compared to his peers on the Saints, Bush is clearly the worst of the bunch and pretty easily an offensive black hole on the roster. He’s the football equivalent of Neifi Perez, a player who gets too many touches for the incredible lack of skills he brings to the field.
Here’s hoping they play him more.
Indeed, brother.
“But, hold on,” some of you must be screaming. “That’s not fair! The Saints offense as a whole was less good in 2007 than in 2006, so of course his yards/catch fell off!”
Really? In 2006, the Saints averaged 5.8 yards/play. In 2007, they averaged 5.5. They did go from first to fifth in total offense, but does that really explain a drop-off from above-average receiving threat to abysmal? I think not.
Besides, a swing of .3 yards/play is far from uncommon. The Colts had a .4 yard drop-off last year. The Chargers lost .7. And so on, and so forth. Small flutuations happen, even in the league’s best offenses. 30 yards per game (the Saints’ loss) is not a huge deal and it definitely does not explain how the World’s Greatest Weapon loses 2.7 yards/catch.
But wait, there’s more! Some more numbers, this time courtesy of me.
Saints’ overall yards/play in 2007: 5.5
Saints’ yards/play on plays where Reggie touched the ball: 4.8
Saints’ yards/play on plays were he did not touch the ball: 5.8Saints’ yards/carry overall: 3.7
Bush’s yards/carry overall: 3.7
Other Saints’ RBs yards/carry: 3.9Other Saints’ yards/catch: 10.6
Saints’ yards/catch overall: 6.8
Bush’s yards/catch overall: 5.7
Filed under “Hmm, Things That Make You Go.” OK, now I hear some of you saying that the loss of Deuce McAllister is why Bush’s yards/catch went down. It’s some argument like “well, without Deuce in there to keep people honest, teams could key on Bush.” Whatever you say, chief.
Oh, except for this: In 2007, when Deuce was out, Bush averaged 6.1 yards/catch. When Deuce was in (or “loose,” if you will), even for part of the game, Bush put up 5.0 yards/catch. Not the greatest sample sizes, I know, but it still makes that Deuce argument seem questionable.
As an aside, I should throw in that the whole “teams had to account for Deuce” argument strikes me as particularly silly. If McAllister, who averaged a whopping 4.3 yards/carry in 2006, had that much effect on the offense as a whole (and Bush in particular), don’t you think you’d see a marked drop-off in the Saints’ offensive production when Deuce didn’t play? Yet, as we already covered, any drop-off was nigh negligible and is just as easily explained by “Reggie Bush brings everyone’s averages down.”
Also, to those who would suggest that Marques Colston’s yards/catch also dropped by 2.5 yards, so there must have been something bigger at play, I have three counter-arguments. First, Colston was an unknown when he entered the league in 2006 and, as such, he did not face CB1s on a regular basis, at least at first. By the start of 2007, he was the biggest threat (by far) in the passing game and, as such, was always defended by the opponents’ best CBs. Second, Colston had 28 more catches in 2007, which would make it more difficult to keep up a ridiculous 14.8 yards/catch. (Hell, Randy Moss averaged 15.2 in his record-breaking season last year. 14.8 is great. Only four WRs last season had as many catches as Colston and had a higher yards/catch.) Third, while Bush’s performance was so bad that it pulled the team’s yards/play down to 5.5 (remember, it was 5.8 when he didn’t touch the ball), the team only averaged 4.8 yards/play when Colston didn’t touch the ball, so comparing his drop to Reggie’s drop is not exactly apples-to-apples.
So, that’s it, right?
Of course not. We would be remiss if we didn’t also throw the following numbers at you:
Reggie’s 8 total fumbles were tops among non-QBs and his 7 rushing fumbles were tops among everyone.
Reggie’s 10 dropped passes (in 12 games) tied him for third in the league (and tied him with people who played 16 games).
The claims about the Saints’ offensive lines woes are likely overblown, as they ranked between 7th and 11th overall in 2007, depending on who you ask.
Behind that line, Reggie Bush ranked 56th out of 56 according to Football Outsiders’ DPAR (Defense-Adjusted Points above Replacement). His DPAR of -8.9 means, in short, that he was worth 8.9 points less than the average NFL backup RB.
Reggie’s career-long run remains at 25 yards. 25. Cedric Benson has a career long of 43 and he’s trying to find a job right now. Benson also had at least one run over 30 yards every year in the league.
SO…what does all this mean? At this point, I am not willing to go all out an call him a bust. That said, however, I will point out that RB is generally agreed to be, by far, the easiest position to transition to from college. DEs and QBs can take three or four years to develop (though Mario is certainly ahead of the curve), while many RBs can and do play well from the jump. Reggie, on the other hand, has not even consistently put up numbers worthy of Blair Thomas.
His numbers do track fairly well with Eric Metcalf, however. So he’s got that going for him. Which is nice.
