Richard Smith and the Mystery of Pass Coverage

If you have read any of the previous Xs/Os things here at DGDB&D, it should be pretty clear that I am defense-first kind of guy. For every one article on zone blocking, there are at least four on some aspect of our defense or lack thereof.  It’s not that I don’t like offense, but given the choice I’d prefer to see Mario Williams knock someone unconscious than watch Owen Daniels get a first down.  I’m just odd, I s’pose.

Anyway, because I’m a defensive guy, watching Richard Smith’s approach to my favorite side of the ball has been especially painful.  Whether it’s repeatedly dropping Mario into coverage against a Tennessee team that didn’t really throw into the flat all day or benching his best cornerback in favor of someone who is in the conversation for worst player in the NFL, Smith consistently does everything wrong—and, conversely, nothing right—in his defensive playcalling.  We’ve covered the lack of blitzing and general lack of common sense and even offered up a possible solution (that Smith would never apply because it takes courage and vision).

The one thing we haven’t really covered, however, except in post-game griping and general comments about defensive failure, is our pass-coverage philosophy.  Yet, after seeing the predictable result of Petey Faggins one-on-one with a WR that only Nnamdi Asomugah could cover, I think it’s about time to tackle the defensive backfield.  I hope to tackle it better than Will Demps is tackling right now.

First, some background.  The Texans play a mix of man coverage (usually in the form of Cover-1 or Cover-2 Man) and Cover-2 zone.  Just so we are all on the same page, let’s look at each of those schemes.  (Note: as always, we are talking in generalizations here.  There are a million tiny variations to all of these…none of which Richard Smith understands.)

Man/Cover-1 Theory.  Our most common form of man coverage is the Cover-1.  (Our second-most common form is the Cover-2 Man, but we’ll hit on that in a minute.)  In Cover-1, the defense has one deep defender at or near the middle of the field (relative to the sidelines) and he is responsible for deep help.  Underneath, you will generally have pure man coverage from your CBs and LBs, with the other safety—usually the SS—free to assist in man coverage, sneak up for run support, or blitz.

If you are paying attention, you can see the biggest flaw in the Cover-1: the deep safety is responsible for a TON of real estate and if he lacks the speed or guesses wrong on where to go, it is almost impossible for him to recover.  Thus a Cover-1 requires a very good FS in the deep coverage.

Under Gregg Williams, the Redskins ran a Cover-1 as a base package quite a bit, with the thinking being that Sean Taylor was more than capable of playing the role.  He was, but Williams continually failed to realize that the scheme put a tremendous amount of pressure on his corners—because they absolutely had to avoid getting burned deep—and they were most certainly not up to that task.  Nevertheless, Williams’ reputation as an aggressive play-caller—a myth that we already addressed before the season—was due in large part to the Cover-1’s requirements.

What I mean by this is, because of the inherent flaw in Cover-1, teams that employ that coverage try to be more aggressive up front to prevent the opponent from having enough time to stretch the field and develop multiple deep routes, thereby protecting the safety.  To do this, the Cover-1 attempts to employ many different blitz packages/man assigments, most of which revolve around bringing the SS up to LB depth and, from here, either blitzing him or blitzing a LB or CB with that safety picking up the appropriate receiver.  For this to be effective, however, any non-blitzing CBs/LBs (especially the WLB) have to be able to cover until the pressure gets to the QB.

Cover-1 also suffers from plenty of room after the catch, as most or all of the underneath defenders are locked up in man coverage of their own and, should a WR catch the ball, are not in position to make a quick tackle.  (Think Greg Camarillo on a slant.)

Why it doesn’t work for the Texans. I think you see where I am going with this.  Basically, in this coverage, you are asking Will Demps to cover sideline to sideline, Brandon Harrison (or, prior, C.N. Brown) to lock up in man coverage, and Petey Faggins and Jacques Reeves to maintain tight man coverage until Richard Smith’s non-effective blitz package gets to the QB.  It should come as no surprise that, in the aforementioned Immolation Of The Faggins looked to be in Cover-1.  [EDIT:  Triple347 says the Johnson completion was in quarter-quarter-half coverage.  See comments for discussion.

Even worse, though, is that Smith bastardizes the hell out of his Cover-1.  Far be it from him to send the SS on a blitz.  No, he utilizes the SS almost entirely in pass coverage from the LB depth.  Meaning that teams with even two games worth of film on the Texans' D quickly figure out that the SS is bluffing and, thus, they don't try to account for him in blitz pickup.  Instead, they take advantage of the fact that our SSs don't backpedal all that well---most don't---and they abuse him in coverage or throw over the top of him if he is dropping back into a middle zone.

When Brown/Harrison aren't all the way up at LB depth, Smith sneaks the up toward the middle of the field and in behind DeMeco Ryans, almost as if they are playing some kind of non-commital run support.  Behind our best tackler.  Because he apparently needs the backup?

Cover-2/Cover-2 Man.  "Cover-2" might be the most overused and misunderstood phrase in football defense today.  Pretty much all teams will occasionally come out in something resembling a Cover-2, but most have a wrinkle of some sort because most lack the personnel to effectively run a true Cover-2.

Cover-2 is a 2-deep, 5-under zone system.  In this coverage, both safeties are responsible for half of the deep part of the field.  The CBs are in press coverage and are each responsible for 1/5th of the short/intermediate zone underneath the two safeties.  The three linebackers are each responsible for another 1/5.  Because the safeties will generally line up between their respective hashmark and the sideline and because they will work toward the sideline at the snap, the biggest hole in the Cover-2 coverage is in between them, behind the MLB.

[Quick side-note:  The Tampa-2 variant drops the MLB into deeper coverage to address the hole in the straight Cover-2 and has the CBs/remaining LBs responsible for 1/4th of the field each.]

Whereas the Cover-1 attempts to be aggressive up front to prevent the big play, the Cover-2 typically uses just the four-man rush and attempts to take away the big play by going into a bend-don’t-break mode.  There are holes in the coverage between the zones, so teams will tend to throw underneath the two safeties, which is just what the defense is encouraging.

In Cover-2 Man, the safeties still play the same way, but the coverage underneath is pure man.  The safeties help with deep coverage into their zones, but the man coverage will stay with the receivers through those zones as well, effectively leading to double-coverage on deep routes.

Regardless of whether the team is in Cover-2 or Cover-2 Man, the one place they should never, ever get beat deep is on the sidelines.  The CBs have the WRs through the intermediate zone and the safeties, who moved toward the sideline at the snap, pick them up as they get deeper.  Assuming your safeties can do that (and that your CBs consider basic things like “turn your head” and “don’t get roasted off the line”), the Cover-2 allows you to force teams to throw short-to-intermediate passes toward the middle of the field (thereby giving you the added benefit of forcing the opposition to throw the ball past many more hands), with the safeties coming up to make quick tackles.  Of course, that also requires that you have safeties that tackle well…

Why this doesn’t work for the Texans. Again, I think you see where this is headed.  The corners that Smith insists on giving the most reps are incapable of defending balls thrown over the top of them. The safeties seem incapable of giving help in the intermediate zone or in picking up WRs as they come into the deep zone.  Will Demps especially has the annoying habit of letting the WR coming into his zone get past him before he reacts.

It is telling that we are CONSISTENTLY beat along the sidelines at every depth.  The basic tenets of this coverage require that you have safeties who can defend the go/corner routes, not let WRs get behind them, and, most importantly, don’t get so worried about the underneath stuff that you bite on double-move.  Simply put, we don’t have that.

****

You see the most glaring common weakness through the whole discussion as it pertains to us?  OUR SAFETIES ARE NOT GOOD ENOUGH TO RUN ANY OF THE COVERAGES WE ARE ASKING THEM TO RUN.  Oh, sure, our Faggins and Reeves are very bad and they deserve their fair share of the blame—blame I am more than happy to heap on Petey at every opportunity—but at least we have Dunta Robinson, Fred Bennett, and Antwaun Molden available.  Cornerback could theoretically be fixed if the DC would use some common sense.  But we are stuck with the safety corps that we currently feature.

So, how to fix it?  By “hiding” the safeties in a Cover-3!

Cover-3 Theory.  If you didn’t know it before, by now you’ve realized that the number in Cover-# refers to the numbers of players in the deep zone.  It’s a handy shorthand, but it does tend to oversimplify things.  Regardless, in the Cover-3, there are (shocking!) three guys in the deep zone, with each responsible for 1/3 of the field.  But here’s the wrinkle: unlike the Cover-2, where the two deep players are safeties, the Cover-3 generally uses two corners and a safety in the deep zone.

in a standard 2-corner, 2-safety scheme, it works like this: On the snap, the FS moves toward the middle of the field.  The two corners are playing up near the line and they break back, basically running with the WRs while working back to their deep thirds.  The SS is freed to rotate into the flat, or blitz, or fill a LB zone if one of them blitzes, or any number of other things.  Also, because he’s not responsible for a deep third, the SS does not have to be able to run with deep routes or backpedal all that well, so you make up for a lack of speed/cover skills at SS.  The OLBs are responsible for the flats or hook zones, while the MLB is responsible for the intermediate middle (DeMeco would excel in this because of his sideline-to-sideline speed).  In one fell swoop, you limited what you are asking each safety to do, you’ve created a situation where DeMeco is utilized to his full ability, you’ve maximized the value of the physical corners (Robinson, Bennett, possibly Molden) because you are allowing them to jam at the line and then run with the route so they can defend the short or intermediate stuff, AND you are putting your OLBs in a position to blitz or cover the hook zone rather than try to run man-to-man with a TE.  And if you can teach him to turn his head, Reeves’ speed would be a huge asset in getting back to his deep third, so even he would be improved.

Sounds cool, no?  But here’s where it gets even better.  You can run all sorts of shapes and formations out of it.  You can disguise it as man coverage by keeping the SS back in his normal spot with the CBs in press coverage.  You can move the SS up into the box for run support or to blitz him.  You can blitz one of the OLBs and abandon the hook zone, assuming you’ll get to him before the WR gets open in the hook/short zone, or have the SS fill that hook zone and hope the QB tries to throw behind the blitz.  You can run a zone blitz in front of the Cover-3, something that would be near impossible in the Cover-2, with the DE dropping into the flat.

And there’s more—you can even change up your personnel within the scheme or the scheme within the personnel.  Because the FS is playing deep center field and ball hawking, you could occasionally put Dunta in that role, with Molden and Bennett playing jam coverage, thereby getting your big physical corners on the field at the same time while also freeing up Dunta to try to knock people out.  You could slide an athletic linebacker like Xavier Adibi into the SS role and have him up in the box doing the same thing your SS would be doing in the straight Cover-3. You can disguise the coverage and confuse the opponent by playing zone on one side while still letting Fred Bennett lock up in man coverage on the other side.  Hell, you can run the Cover-3 with your nickel package, with one corner locking up in man, one dropping into a deep third, and both safeties staying back.  (You’ll notice that ALL these iterations ask the safeties to do less than we are currently asking them to do, while attempting to create some confusion and pressure up front and maintain deep coverage across the entire deep zone.)

Now, of course, all defenses have holes and inherent weaknesses.  Cover-3 is no different.  It is particularly susceptible to short routes if the CBs are selling out to get back to their deep zones quickly.  This can be overcome somewhat by cheating out just a little bit with the OLBs and getting them into the flats more quickly.  Additionally, you can swap coverage zones every now and then—for example, have the SS retreat into the deep zone the CB rotate up into the hook/flat zone if you catch a QB trying to consistently throw underneath the retreating CB.  Even with these drawbacks and flaws, I know I would feel a lot better asking Bennett to react to a quick hitch than asking Will Demps to make an open field tackle.  (And I’m fairly confident that the 96-yarder to Calvin Johnson doesn’t happen if we are in Cover-3.)

***

Take just a second and think about this whole discussion.  You have three basic coverage philosophies here.  Your personnel is a bad fit for one, a horrible fit for one, and a pretty good fit for one.  Why in the name of Durga would the bad one and the horrible one get used extensively while the pretty good fit gets left on the bench beside your best cover corner?

The answer, best I can tell, is because Richard Smith is trying to kill me.

Bennett. Fred Bennett. Revisited.

In response to the article quoted in this post, I emailed KC Joyner and asked for a little more explanation of the methodology.  He was kind enough to reply.

Try this on for an expansion:

In Scientific Football 2008 and my 2008 Draft Guide (both of which can be ordered at www.TheFootballScientist.com) I rated matchups by color ranking, with red being difficult, yellow being average and green being favorable. Against red matchup WRs in 2007 (those that gained 9.0 YPA or higher), Bennett allowed only 6.8 YPA.  That’s very good (29th best out of 95 qualifiers) but it pales in comparison to how Bennett handled yellow rated (7-9 YPA) and green rated (less than 7 YPA) WRs.  His 3.3 versus yellow rated was the 2nd best in the league and his 3.0 against green rated was tied for 19th.  Add them all up and his overall YPA against WRs was 2nd best in the league.  I’ve been touting him as a future Pro Bowl candidate for how well he played last year.

So, hopefully, that clears it up a bit more.  Bennett was good against top-notch receivers, very good against mediocre guys, and downright dominant against the guys in-between.  The good news being, of course, that if you assume talent is distributed on a bell curve, Bennett (and all corners) are going to face a lot more “yellow” receivers than “red” or “green” ones.

Now, I know this seems foreign to us as Texans fans, but IF Molden really is ahead of where Bennett was this time last year (as sources seem to be saying) AND IF Ray Rhodes really saw enough talent in Jacques Reeves that the organization thought Reeves was worth that price tag AND IF Dunta comes back at even 90% of where he was…well, kids, we might just be in the enviable situation of having too many very good (or better) CBs.  (And, as a bonus, we can finally give Petey his walking papers.)  Even better, with only one or two of those IFs coming to fruition, we are finally set at CB.

This is all foreign and slightly frightening.  Hold me.

Bennett. Fred Bennett.

From the latest issue of ESPN the Magazine:

You heard it here first: these four defenders will bust out in ‘08.
By K.C. Joyner, The Football Scientist

Sleepers? Not exactly. More like Leonardo DiCaprio circa What’s Eating Gilbert Grape. You immediately spotted greatness, but the rest of the world needed some time to recognize it. Each of these defensive players is 24 or younger, and all are on the cusp of that magical tipping point.

[...]

FRED BENNETT
CB, Texans
To experts who say Dunta Robinson is the best corner in Houston, think again. Bennett is not only better than Robinson, the stats say he was the premier corner in the league last season. The 24-year-old Bennett, a fourth-round pick in 2007, actually had better metrics in his eight starts than any numbers Robinson has posted in his four-year career. Bennett’s 4.7 overall YPA led the league among corners with 60-plus attempts, and opposing WRs gained only 67 total yards on the 24 combined medium, deep and bomb passes he faced. With pass-happy teams like the Steelers, Colts and Browns on Houston’s sked in 2008, Bennett’s name will be on everyone’s lips.

Here’s the link, though I don’t know if it will work if you don’t have ESPN Insider.  If not, you’re not missing much, as I’ve included all the relevant text anyway.  I have an email in to KC and I will update this post if he responds.

Until then, just consider this a very, VERY good sign.  If Rhodes can do something with Reeves and/or Molden blossoms, then getting Dunta back is gravy and we suddenly have a real reason to consider moving him to Free Safety.  (For further reasons Dunta would make a great free safety, see my last post re: our FSs past.)

Kickoff

Fuzzy math.  The Titans claim Haynesworth’s one-year tender offer makes him the highest paid player in football.  Haynesworth’s agent disagrees.  Haynesworth responded by punching an eldery lady and squishing a newborn baby with his bare hands. (h/t Eric)

Irritating trends in national sports journalism. I post this article merely as further proof that Morlon Greenwood is the most underrated player in football.  He is lumped into the guys who are “holes around” Mario, Amobi, and DeMeco.  Fred Bennett is also, apparently, part of that group.

The is your brain on drugs.  Following up from BFD’s Kickoff yesterday, Chris has added a second round of numbers to the predictions for the BE-SF’s 2008 season.  Suffice it to say that, should these numbers pan out, the Titans will be one of the greatest offensive teams in the history of football.  Which will be even more impressive, since they are doing it without WRs.

Finally.  Some retard wrote a breakdown of the Texans’ running back situation.

Kickoff

You do realize you list wins and then losses, right?  Apparently, the fine folks over at Music City Miracles know something the rest of us don’t.  I can only assume that they’ve learned from their super-inside sources that Vince Young will not be playing this year.  Because that’s the only way “anything less than 10-6 is unexcusable” makes sense.

At least the Bennett choice makes sense. Pete Prisco continues his mancrush on the Texans as well as his overarching idiocy in his list of 30 players poised to break out this season.  Number 13? Eric Winston.  AKA “The Guy Who Was One Of The Best RTs In Football Last Year.”  How do you break out from that? (H/T Eric)

Vaya con dios, dick.  Jared “I’M A COLLEGE STAR…I DRIVE A DODGE STRATUS!” Zabranksi was dumped by the Steelers.  Statue of Liberty play <<< Dennis Dixon’s talent. (Also via Eric)

A revised look at 4-3 defensive theory

Because two of my good friends are Giants and Redskins fans, respectively, I find myself engaged in more conversations about NFC East football that one would expect for a Texans fan. However, because I am obsessed with defensive football–especially defensive line play–I actually enjoy these chats and, more often than not, come away with some new ideas about our team.

Anyway, one idea that we’ve been kicking around lately is that the Texans should run a variation on the Eagles’ defense because (a) our personnel is tailor-made for such a system and (b) that system would allow our front seven to protect the weaknesses in our back four, just like it did for the Super Bowl Champion Giants.  Sounds good, no?

Let me back up a bit, though, and lay this out. Back in late October of last season, I wrote a long post advocating, first, that we blitz, and, second, that we come up with some creative fronts and utilize the zone blitz more often.

2b. So, then…how should we go about blitzing (other than with the aforementioned proper use of the WLB)? The answer is simple: the zone blitz

[4-3 defense 102 here. Feel free to skip ahead.]

The idea behind the zone blitz is two-fold. First, duh, create pressure. Second, however, it tries to confuse the offense’s blocking calls by sending any of the three linebackers (or, occasionally, a safety) while someone else fills the space left by the vacating backer. In that way, the defense does not lose the extra hands in coverage, but should still be able to get penetration because the offensive line will not know where the blitz is coming from on a given play.

For example, the zone blitz allows the MLB to blitz through the A-gap, while the nose tackle stunts over through the B-gap. In coverage, the WLB fills the space vacated by the MLB and the RDE drops back and out into the space that WLB would fill in a standard two deep zone. So, when the QB sees the MLB attack, his natural reaction is to look to throw at where the blitz came from (or, if he’s guessing that the WLB will fill, to where the WLB came from), only to find the ball thrown right at a defender.

Then, on the very next play, with the very same package, the team could go with a more traditional WLB blitz, but have the RDE slide back to fill. We saw this play once or twice in the preseason with Shantee Orr lined up outside the RDE and it was effective.

An added bonus of blitzing out of a two-deep zone is that it allows our best defensive player to make even more of an impact on the game. DeMeco Ryans has two sacks this season, both of which have come on a straight blitz. On both plays, he came more or less untouched (one against Harrington late in the game when we decided to actually play D and the one last week where he nearly killed Kerry Collins) because he was allowed to read the offensive line and choose between the A- and B-gap and he smacked the QB right in the mouth. He has also been asked to run blitz a couple times and he’s found success there. So, if we start using him on some zone blitzes, teams will have to account for him more. Meaning that blitzes from other positions–say Danny Clarkstunting over the LDE with Morlon Greenwood dropping back to the middle and DeMeco filling the space where the SLB would normally be–a team throwing over the blitz would be throwing the ball right at our best defensive weapon. Likewise, letting DeMeco creep up and show blitz, especially if he’d already had success, would create more chances for the d-linemen on either side of him to get ignored by an overzealous o-lineman. And so on, and so forth.

[/4-3 Defense 102]

I cannot state this strongly enough. Blitzing is a necessity when you have 1/4th of a real secondary.Zone blitzing allows for our strong front seven to create mismatches while still keeping two or three extra bodies in coverage and allowing our best defensive player to better impact the game. While you cannot necessarily use the zone blitz on every down (it becomes less effective at some point), how is this not a better option than dropping the three LBs, relying entirely on your front four for any pressure on the QB, and watching the QB have time to locate and throw at Petey Faggins?

3. Why do we use our front four in such a vanilla manner?

Just like you can’t run the zone blitz on every defensive snap, if you do anything over and over, eventually everyone in the NFL will know your tendencies. (By “eventually,” I mean “by next week.”) Right now, we have the same formulaic defensive line positions. Mario at RDE on running plays, Mario at LDE on passing plays, blah blah blah.

Why?

First of all, backing up a step, why when Mario moves to LDE–a move I really, really like–do the tackles not flip-flop so that Amobi Okoye is not beside Mario? We’ve covered this before. Yes, I am fully aware that Amobi has four sacks and that, on three of those, Mario is clearly occupying at least two blockers. That’s all well and good, but, like we said before, it’s not really the highest, best use of their talents. Flipping Amobi puts your two-gap, big-bodied tackle between Mario and Okoye. It is this player’s goal to pick up two blockers, which means that either Amobi or Mario (or, possibly, both) would draw single blocking more often than not. Meaning, oh I don’t know, that we would get more consistent penetration from both sides of the line.

But, back to where we started question 3: why even have a definite set order for your defensive linemen? I mean, sure, if you are going to have set positions based on down and distance, then for god’s sake, do it correctly within the constraints of the 4-3. But do you really even have to have set positions? Right now, you have Mario Williams who, though Richard Justice would disagree, is actually playing very well [This sentence is hilarious in retrospect. --Ed.]. You have Amobi Okoye, who is playing the pass-rush role as well as we hoped and playing the running game better than we hoped. AND you have Travis Johnson who is just playing some inspired football right now, hustling, hitting people, and playing like you would hope a first-round DT would [Did I really write that? Jeez. --Ed.]. That’s three real pass rushers, plus we haven’t even touched on Kalu,WeaverMaddox, etc.

With that kind of ability up front, why become so predictable that teams can game plan and negate some of the advantage you have? Mix it up a little. Go big on one play and have Mario, Maddox, Johnson, and Amobi from left to right. Next time out, go with your more traditional base. Then turn around and go small (relatively speaking) with Mario, Okoye, Cochran, and Orr [Replace "Orr" with "Colvin" or "Thompson" --Ed.]. Create a mismatch by putting Mario at under tackle and then having him twist-stunt with Weaver lined up at DE. The possibilities are vast…if you will just use them.

Note: I am fully aware that Mario moved around a lot last year and that some of the coaching staff thought that might have been his “problem.” You know, rather than just having an injured foot and being a rookie at a tough position. That’s all well and good, but setting up your front so that he is guaranteed to get doubled on every single play is hardly the answer.

I guess the bigger point here for question three is JUST DO SOMETHING. Don’t keep running out there with a predictable front four rotation, no blitz packages to speak of, and a secondary that can’t cover for as long as you are asking them to. DO SOMETHING.

The great thing about the 4-3 is the balance. But that balance is in terms of playing the run versus playing the pass, meaning you still have to play to the strengths of your D. Consistency in game planning will always equal regression in the NFL; worse, consistently planning in the same incorrect manner will always equal failure.

While a number of you bought into my arguments, there were a good number who argued that “we’d blitz if we could” and “Richard Smith is doing the best he can with what he has.”  Of course, my whole argument was that, no he wasn’t, but that’s beside the point.  The point is the team did start blitzing the very next week (I know you are reading this, Smith!) and did so with success, I might add.  Unfortunately, it never really got into the idea of true zone blitzing or, more importantly, blitzing teams with high-octane offenses (read: the Colts game) and there was little or no creativity shown in our alignments and packages.

Now, I still stand by my assertions that my approach to the defense would work and work well given our roster.  However, upon further review, I see that there is an even better approach we could take.

Which brings us to the Eagles’ scheme.  And, even better, brings us to an Xs and Os breakdown of said scheme.

The Eagles ostensibly run a 4-3 defense.  Their system differs from the standard 4-3, though, in a number of ways, all of them significant.

1. The Outside Linebackers. Instead of having a true SLB and WLB, they make the two OLBs interchangeable in terms of responsibilities and positioning. Using these fungible LBs, on nearly every play one of the OLBs rotates up, creating a five-man front and showing blitz while the other rotates back, creating additional space between himself and the line.  Despite being on the line, however, there is no guarantee that that linebacker will blitz; the Eagles will sometimes bring the other OLB, a CB, a safety, or nobody at all (though bringing no one is rare–the Eagles blitz almost 65% of the time), with the up linebacker dropping into coverage either by hitting a specified zone or by picking up the TE or RB or FB in man coverage.

On the other hand, there will obviously be times when the up linebacker does blitz.  In this system, though, he might be joined in the rush by the other OLB, by either corner, or (one of the Eagles’ favorite moves) by the safety.  Or maybe he’s joined by two or three of those guys.  Or maybe you think he’s going to be joined by the safety, only to find the safety back in coverage right as you release the ball…see where I’m going with this?

Another facet of the Philly scheme is that OLB speed is not as important as instincts and the ability to get where you need to be in coverage. This is not to say that speed isn’t an asset–of course it is. Rather, it just means that a player like Greenwood who has shown great instincts (see, e.g., the Atlanta game when he realized Faggins had blown the underneath coverage and tried to get there from his spot on the edge) becomes more  valuable in this system. 

2. The Middle Linebacker. The Eagles’ system simultaneously limits the MLB and gives him greater freedom to impact the game, which sounds illogical but isn’t.  In your standard 4-3, the MLB generally reads the offensive line and the FB and then flows to a hole, whether that hole is in the A-gap or all the way out in the D-gap. But his flow to the hole is limited by his added responsibility of maintaining interior defensive positioning until he is sure there is no cut-back run.  Only after making all of the proper reads is your MLB free to use his speed and be the sideline-to-sideline playmaker.  

In the Philly scheme, the MLB has two responsibilities–the A-gaps–because all of the other holes are filled with rushing bodies. If the play goes away from these gaps, the MLB’s defined responsibilities are done and he is freed to roam the field, ad-lib, and create plays, meaning that he doesn’t have to have the same great recovery speed that the standard 4-3 MLB does.  It is this simultaneous limiting and freeing that makes someone like Jeremiah Trotter a dominant MLB in this system; ask him to play sideline-to-sideline like a typical 4-3 MLB as they did in Washington and he sucks immensely, but put him in Philly where he only has to play the A-gaps and he’ll consistently get 100 solo tackles and 3-5 sacks a year.

3. Defensive Line Theory. In Philly’s scheme, the only player in the front seven who has true two-gap responsibility is the Nose Tackle, and even he only has to do it every once in a while.  (The MLB is responsible for two gaps, but they are really just the same gap on either side of the center and not a two-gap responsibility in the same sense that the NT has.) Now, on the face of it, that is not so different from a standard 4-3. The devil is in the details, though.

A typical 4-3 is a read-and-react defense for everyone except a blitzer (and, really, even he is supposed to do this).  Now, while the linemen in a 4-3 only have one gap responsibility, the difference between their one-gap requirements and Philly’s DL one-gap requirements is one of intent and initial movement. For example, in the read-and-react approach, his primary responsibility is to read the lineman blocking him because, while he has C- or D-gap (depending on alignment and shift) requirements as well as contain, he has to remain in position to go either direction with respect to his blocker–on an inside run, he has to be able to shed the block and crash down; on an outside run, he needs to get free of the block and seal the edge. To do this successfully, the lineman must stand his blocker up and stay square with him long enough to read the play and react to it (hence the name).

In an attacking, Philly-style system, which is a one-gap attacking approach, the first responsibility for the DE as well as all the other lineman is to get 1.5 to 2 yards upfield, then flow to the ball. What this means in practice (assuming perfect execution) is, in a read-and-react D, every lineman stands his blocker up, then flows along the face of the blockers down the line of scrimmage to the ball, while, in an attacking one-gap system, the defensive linemen get behind the blockers and then flow (or, more accurately, crash) to the ball.

As a quick aside, obviously, each system will have its flaws and benefits. The read-and-react defense expect the linebackers to make most of the tackles, which means consistent positive yardage for the opposing team, yet it also gives you a safety net of a clogged line and three backers moving to the ball. The attacking defense runs a risk of giving up the big play if the linemen or LBs miss their tackles, but it also gives you a near certainty of consistently stopping the opposition for no gain or a loss.

A second difference in D-line theory between the two schemes is movement of the front four by way of stunts and whatnot. Because it is a one-gap system, the linemen are freed to do any number of a variety of stunts so long as the movement ends with one of them in each gap. While such stunts are theoretically possible in a standard 4-3, you can’t do it too much when the DTs may have multiple gaps or when you are worried about breaking contain on the outside. When you are sending the house on a blitz, however, all that matters is (a) that a body ends up in each of the gaps and (b) that you can count on your MLB to make tackles on anyone who comes thru the A gaps or slips around the edge (which goes back to the freedom of the MLB’s responsibilities).

4. Coverage. Much like the front seven, the coverage in a Philly scheme is incredibly fluid. If you watch the Eagles (or the Giants, who are actually a better comparison given their lack of a super secondary), the coverage calls might change two or three times before the ball is snapped. An initial coverage is called based on down and distance. Once the offense breaks its huddle, the coverage is changed if necessary to account for the personnel and the formation. Even better, the coverage can change on the fly after the ball is snapped. So, while the Cover 2 (which is pretty much a one-gap system up front) has players moving to specified zones and has some discrete coverage schemes within the larger system, the Philly system moves seamlessly from zone to man to zone again.

I just re-read that paragraph and it is not overly clear. By way of an incredibly simplistic example (that doesn’t account for some coverage variables): In the Philly system, assume the defense has called a 5-man blitz based on the offense’s personnel of two WR and two TE on third-and-long and that the OLB who has rotated up to the line is supposed to cover one tight end, the nickel corner is coming on the blitz, and the other OLB is picking up the second TE. Now, presnap, the offense shifts the second TE out wide, so the coverage audibles for the third CB to pick up the second TE and the OLB who was going to pick up that TE to blitz. At the snap, the TE who was to be picked up by the up linebacker stays in to block, so that OLB instantly becomes a blitzer as well.  You’ve gone from a 5-man corner blitz to a 6-man two-LB blitz without changing your alignment or your package. By bringing out the extra TE, the offense has caused more blitzers to come.  That’s some beautiful stuff right there–it’s the beauty of the system that, should the defense recognize the initial blitz and audible into something else, your system accounts for that by changing your blitz altogether.

The second part of the scheme is that it does not pigeonhole your coverage into a certain system. So often, teams that run a Cover 2 design their blitzes based on the principles and assignments of the Cover 2. You will almost never see them come with a safety blitz because that leaves a hole in the coverage they are comfortable running and it is impossible to disguise from the Cover 2 alignment. A corner blitz is disguiseable because the CBs line up on the line, but it requires an OLB to cheat out and cover the area where the corner vacated, which is always dangerous.

But, as Philly showed against New England and Dallas last year, their system doesn’t force you into any specific pass defense. Against the Pats, the Eagles blitzed constantly, from all sorts of angles, and played straight up man coverage behind it and very nearly won that game. In the first half against the Cowboys, Philly again brought extra rushers, but alternated between man and zone behind it. Then, in the second half, they continued to show blitz on every play, but dropped everyone into coverage. The first half pressure had gotten to Romo, though, and he could not find a rhythm even when the blitz didn’t come.

Underlying each of these differences are the basic tenets of the system–create confusion by showing lots of different looks pre-snap and by bringing pressure from all sorts of locations, never let the offense know who is coming or how many are coming (anywhere from 5-8, but more than 4 about 2/3 of the time), and plug every hole while confusing the O-line and causing them to make mistakes. Basically, it’s an offensive take on defense: an attempt to create plays rather than reacting to what the offense is doing. Get upfield, and then play football.

How Does This Apply To Us?

Which brings us to the point of this post. Namely that your Houston Texans possess enough talent and flexibility in their front seven to run a modified version of this system and run it well.

Our defensive line would thrive in the one-gap approach. Imagine telling Mario Williams and even Anthony Weaver, “ok, first we want you to just get in the backfield, then worry about where the ball is.” Could anyone stop Mario in that situation if he didn’t have to react to the play before choosing a lane? Hell, could any TWO people consistently stop him in that situation? I think not. Weaver, likewise, would thrive because he would not have to react to left tackles–something he lacks the speed to do consistently–as much as just beat them off the line and get past them on whatever line he wants. Amobi and Frank Okam on the inside would also be fantastic in this scheme–you wouldn’t be asking two young players to read the play and their blockers. Amobi has already shown a nose for the ball, so you’d be telling him to follow those instincts. And Okam would actually be better than anything Philly uses on the inside–both of their starting DTs are much smaller than he is–and as the only two-gapper would have the girth to really eat up the blockers in his path. Hell, this system would even make Travis Johnson valuable again as the backup for both tackle positions. Love him or hate him (and I did both last year), his biggest problem is that he’s too small to really be a two-gap NT. This system would make him just put his head down and go upfield rather than trying to take on two blockers, so you could spell Okam with him when you didn’t need a two-gapper at all, or Johnson could back up Okoye. Oh, and Rosie Colvin? He could be the second D-end in nickel situations because, like Weaver, his success would not depend on being able to react and beat a LT. Much like Mathias Kiwanuka was for the Giants, he would be the pin-your-ears-back rusher in pure passing downs.

Like I said way back up there, this defense would make Greenwood even better than he has been for us. (And he has been very good, but that’s a whole other article.) Opposite him, it would make life both easier and more fun for Zac Diles–he would be freed from playing the standard run-stopping role of the SLB and would be allowed to use his speed and ability more freely. Plus, you are simplifying the game for a young guy learning a new position because you are giving him specific assignments–rotate up and blitz, rotate up and cover the TE (but blitz if he tries to block you), rotate back and cover the TE/RB, rotate back and blitz. Simple, straightforward.  You could also sub in Chaun Thompson in pure passing downs if you thought he was a better blitzer than Diles because teams would then assume he was coming, even when he wasn’t.

I’ve mentioned the Giants a few times through this thing as a more apt comparison for us and a better model to build from. This is because the Eagles have one piece that we do not have–Brian Dawkins.  Dawkins role in the Philly system is manifold: he is an additional linebacker, he plans man-up on WRs, he blitzes, and he patrols the deep middle. We don’t have a player that can do that unless and until Dunta comes back as a FS.  (Which would be amazingly perfect for this system.) The Giants don’t have the dominating safety, nor do they really have an impressive secondary, but they run a version of this same Philly defense up front (Steve Spagnolo is from the Philly organization) and they won the Super Bowl with it! All without a great secondary.  Sound familiar?

The important thing is, if you lack the physical presence of a Brian Dawkins, you have to have a safety back there who is smart enough to make the right reads for the coverage. For the Super Bowl Champion Giants, it was Gibril Wilson. For us, it could just as easily be Will Demps, who might not be Dawkins but is a smart, instinctive safety nonetheless.  In fact, to paraphrase my buddy Rendhel, the Giants have not had a great secondary in years, but they always have a good defense because they understand the value of pressuring the QB.  When they got Spagnolo and the Philly system, they took this appreciation of pressure to a new level.

Right now, we don’t have a very good secondary, but we seem to also lack the proper appreciation for just how much QB pressure can improve the coverage. Jacques Reeves is blindingly fast, meaning he could come on corner blitzes. But he could also stay with anyone in the league for two or three seconds. It’s when you start asking him to cover longer that he becomes a liability. Fred Bennett is an instinctive young player and will probably become pretty good, but he has still shown that he can be beat if you ask him to cover too long–why not remove that liability more often than not?

I could go on and on, but the point is that we have the personnel to do this and we have first-hand evidence that this kind of defense turns an otherwise non-spectacular team into a playoff team and a real contender. Unfortunately, we also have a defensive coordinator who wouldn’t blitz at all until around Halloween and then backed of his blitzing any time it stumbled a bit. That is the absolute worst attitude a d-coordinator can have.  Now, maybe the presence of Ray Rhodes (phormer Philly coach!) will give Smith the testicular fortitude to at least be more aggressive. I can dream, I guess. Because, until we get a new coordinator or our coordinator gets a new outlook, this post is nothing but navel gazing to a disgusting degree.

Like always, though, just because they won’t do it, doesn’t mean I am wrong.

Kickoff

Cars Go Vroom: Remember that Lamborghini video from last year that showed Mario Williams driving roughly 600 MPH?  Yeah, totally understandable…because Mario has an addiction.  To cars.  No, seriously.  ”At age 21, Williams actually entered the league with a list of expensive vehicles he planned to purchase after being drafted.”

Overstating The Obvious: From the AP’s Kristie Rieken: “With [Dunta] Robinson likely out until midseason with an injury, [Fred] Bennett knows it’s now up to him to lead the group until his mentor returns.”  Tomorrow: Water is wet, the sky is blue, and Cowboys fans are insufferable.

Our bad: As first reported at BRB, Wal-Mart pulled a total dick move and refused to give underprivileged kids ice and water when Andre Johnson “only” purchased 677 bikes (at full retail) instead of the 750 he ordered (and they failed to provide). Well, apparently Wal-Mart realized that this was potentially bad PR, so they donated 400 free bikes to the cause, as well as food, water, and ice.

Daily Colvin Story: Not only did Rosy visit the Texans (and Colts), he underwent physicals for both teams and, according to Rotoworld, passed both.  As an aside, Rotoworld also speculates that the Texans are primarily interested in him as a SLB, which I am totally in favor of.

Note: I am leaving for Gulf Shores around lunchtime, so this is it for me today most likely.

Okam? Damn near killed ‘im!

I love to quote myself as an authority in later conversations. It really disorients the listener and, if you are engaged in a debate of some sort, bolsters your own cred and you current argument at the same time. It works in pretty much any discussion.

“Man, Pacino is a much better actor than DeNiro.” “Actually, as I noted just two weeks ago, DeNiro’s range makes him a much better actor than Pacino.”

“I love creamy peanut butter.” “Interesting, but are you aware that I stated over a year ago that crunchy peanut butter is the bee’s knees?”

“You suck.” “Have you considered my findings of 4/12/06 that you are a shiteating cockrag?”

Anyway, with that in mind, I won’t be grading this year’s draft in any sort of conventional sense. Because, as I said in this blog’s inaugural post,

Speaking of “grading” the drafts, let me just say that I find the whole process asinine. The two most important things in a draft should be (a) filling needs and (b) taking the best available player to fill those needs (with an eye on not drafting a player too early). Unfortunately, most people seem to grade the draft by guessing what the drafted players will do in the NFL. Teams that get the Can’t Miss players automatically “score” higher. But, for every Reggie Bush, there are multiple Can’t Miss guys like Robert Gallery, Charles Rogers, and Joey Harrington. Even more to the point, there are plenty of guys in this and every draft taken after the first round or two who will become stars. So, when Kiper says that the Raiders did well because they got a “franchise QB” in JaMarcus Russell, he’s talking out of his ass. Which probably also has fantastically groomed hair.

I stand by that; grading a draft is stupid because it assumes you know what players are going to do. Or you are simply giving the best grades to the teams who got more of the players you rated highly beforehand, which is also stupid. So, aside from my esteemed co-blogger, who I would totally make out with if we weren’t both straight guys, anyone who grades a draft can go die in a fire.

What I will do, however, is offer a completely biased, utterly unscientific ranking of the players into categories of my own choosing. This is not a draft grade, it’s an arms race, ho. Or something like that.

Player Whose Selection I Absolutely Love:

Xavier Adibi–Well before people started declaring for the draft, Adibi was on my shortlist of LBs possibly coming out (along with Laurinitis and Beckwith). I even watched four VaTech games solely to keep an eye on him. So, yeah, you could say I am thrilled about this pick. He has insane lateral speed, a great nose for the ball, and I don’t think I ever saw him give up on a play. Plus, he knocks the shit out of people, seemingly just for fun sometimes. I dare say that, if he becomes the player I think he will, a trio of Adibi, Greenwood, and DeJesus gives us one of the best LB units in the league. At worst, his selection will push Zach Diles to become a better OLB, so it’s kind of win-win. In fact, the only person this selection is probably bad news for is Kevin Bentley–I don’t see us breaking camp with six linebackers and my guess is that we’ll take Adibi, DeMeco, Greenwood, Diles, and Thompson. (This is subject to change if BFD’s “Thompson as DE” theory pans out.)

Players Whose Selections Make Me Excited In A Non-Sexual Way:

Frank Okam–While I think BFD might be throwing out the ultimate absolute best-case scenario when he likens Okam to Shaun Rogers, I am a big fan of Frank. Given that I basically screamed for a NT non-stop over the last three months, getting a really bright guy who is 6′4″/350 and runs a 5.32 is like a dream come true. I am not buying the “move him to guard” talk for a second, as Okam is immediately the best NT prospect we have. Yes, that includes you, Trav, you underwhelming fuckhole. Anyway, getting Okam in Day 2 more than makes up for not getting Balmer with our first rounder in my book. Plus, I honestly think that his presence makes Amobi and Mario better this year, which should frighten the sweet tap-dancing Christ out of opposing QBs.

Steve Slaton–The thing that really excites me about Slaton is that I think we got a great bargain where we picked him. If you harken back to, say, August 2007, Slaton and Brian Brohm were talked about as early Heisman favorites. Now, neither had the season to back that up, but–in Slaton’s case, at least–I don’t think that’s entirely his fault. That WVU team had so many weapons in the backfield that I feel safe in assuming Steve merely got lost in the shuffle. Once Pat White started dominating with his legs in the spread, Slaton’s role was diminished and it was further hurt by the impact of Noel Devine and Owen Schmitt. *takes another sip of the Kool-Aid* Regardless of whether I am indulging in wishful thinking, one thing is for sure: Slaton is the potential homerun threat that we haven’t had since…um…ever.

Players Whose Selections Do Not Make Me Want To Kill Someone:

Antwaun Molden–We needed a CB according to many people and, other than DR-C (side note: Fuck you to death, Arizona), I wasn’t really wanting to take one with our first-round pick after overpaying Frenchy Reeves. So getting Molden answered both of my wishes with respect to this position. As others have more descriptively detailed, Molden is a physical corner and is a workout warrior. Reminds me of a certain Gamecock we drafted last year.

Dominique Barber– The only reason I don’t dislike this pick is because I am all for some good, old fashioned competition in the safety corps during this year’s camp. I’ve never been much of a fan of C.C. Brown or Glenn Earl, so bringing in more bodies to up the level that people will have to perform is all right by this guy.

Player Whose Selection Will Only Be Acceptable If Accompanied By A Pro Bowl Selection:

Duane Brown–Look, I’ve read all the explanations for taking him. For the record, I like this one from Chris the best. But here’s my problem with this pick: the beauty of the ZBS is that in all the years Gibbs has been doing it, he’d only taken an offensive lineman once in the first round.

Another consistent thing about Gibbs’ teams–more often than not, they don’t take offensive linemen early in the draft. In 1984, the first o-lineman they took was in Round 8 (Winford Hood). In 1985, Round 5 (Billy Hinson). In 1986, Round 4 (Jim Juriga–this one is misleading, though, because the fourth round was the first pick Denver had). In 1987, Round 8 (Dan Morgan). In 1995, Round 4 (Jamie Brown). In 1996, Round 7 (Leslie Ratliff). In 1997, Round 3 (Dan Neil). In 1998, Round 7 (Trey Teague). In 1999, Round 2 (Lennie Friedman). In 2000, Round 4 (Cooper Carlisle). In 2001, Round 4 (Ben Hamilton). In 2002, they didn’t draft one. Finally, in 2003, Round 1 (George Foster).

When he went to Atlanta, the trend continued. 2004–didn’t draft one. 2005–Round 5 (Frank Omiyale). 2006–Round 5 (Quinn Ojinnaka).

Look at those names for a second.  Presumably, these are all guys that Gibbs was “really high on,” yet only one of them warranted a first-round selection.  By taking Brown in the first round, Gibbs must be saying that Brown is such a perfect fit for his system that Gibbs absolutely could not take the chance of not getting him.  In short, Brown must be the ultimate archetype of a ZBS lineman.  Or at least as much of an archetype as George Foster was.
Yeah…

Anyway, that’s not the reason the selection pissed me off so much.  If Brown really is designed for the ZBS, that’s great.  But the question is whether he’s better at LT than Mendenhall would have been at RB.  Or Jenkins would have been at corner.  Sure, we got Slaton and Molden, which definitely eases the sting a bit, but if Brown falls on his face (or even if Mendenhall and Jenkins thrive elsewhere while Brown is just average), there is going to be a huge “what if Gibbs had just stuck to his pattern and not reached for Brown” hanging over the pick.

Player Whose Selection Suggests Kubiak Must Owe Alex Brink’s Dad A Favor:

Alex Brink–Seriously…what the fuck?

What’s that, Lassie? I haven’t posted anything substantive in a long time?!

As if you hadn’t noticed, I have REALLY been slacking off over here of late. I don’t have an excuse for it other than actual work at work is cutting into my sweet, sweet blogging time. I am contemplating lighting the place on fire just so I can get a vacation.

In any event, I’ll try to be better about it leading up to the draft. For now, allow me to bust out the old bulleted list.

  • ***I have been fairly open about my hope that the Texans take a defensive tackle (read: Kentwan Balmer) at 18, followed by a DE in the third. Not to rehash old arguments, but my reasoning basically goes that a space-eating NT would make life easier for Amobi and Mario, thus making life easier on the secondary, AND I think Earl Cochran might have enough talent to become a rotational DE. All that said, I just took a peak at Anthony Weaver’s stats for the last two years and I am starting to think that the “Draft a DE first” crowd is on to something. One fucking sack in two years? Seriously?!? I mean, I knew the dude had been more or less invisible, but jesus titty fucking christ, even I could get one sack in two years. Hell, with Mario opposite him, Weaver should be able to vulture one or two sacks per year just by way of falling on QBs who are scrambling away from our good DE. And he’s the highest-paid Texans? Fantastic. I am getting angry…better move on.
  • ***As first mention by new-BRBer, SOLIS, the Texans re-signed C.C. Brown. I’m of two minds about this. First, C.C. has basically been asstastic for most of his Texans tenure, so one wonders just why the team would throw dollars at him. On the other hand, though, his biggest problem (and the primary cause of his asstasticness) is not a lack of talent but a complete lack of understanding how to position himself. This being the case, C.C. might fall under the same “Ray Rhodes project” label as Jacques Reeves. In any event, I guess I like the idea of giving him a year under a good teacher before kicking him to the proverbial curb.
  • ***Ray Rhodes cannot fix Petey Faggins. Jesus himself could not fix Petey Faggins. If Jesus and Durga had a baby and that baby married the current Dali Lama, the spawn of that relationship could not fix Petey Faggins.
  • ***Someone emailed me this article from 2001 about Megan Manfull. Pretty boring shit, really; it’s the kind of stuff you would imagine in a fluff piece about “oooh, look, girls can write about sports, too!” What did stand out, however, was one quote from Manfull herself.

    ‘My mother taught me so much, Megan said. ‘I got started in seventh grade on our junior high newspaper. I thought it was fun, and I’d come home at night and she’d give me her lessons from her high school classes. I learned to put questions together and do interviews. I was the only junior high reporter turning in stories with quotes and sources in them.’

    See, kids, this what we call irony. Manfull’s memory of starting in print media was that she was the only one citing sources and using actual quotes and now she is part of a paper where such tactics are again missing. This isn’t so much “funny ha ha” as “funny sad,” I guess.

  • ***Finally, in generic NFL news, the league approved a number of rule changes for next year. A couple are common sense stuff–FGs are now reviewable, teams can defer after winning a coin toss–but three could have some actual impact. First, one defensive player is allowed to have a radio in his helmet (aka The Spygate Rule). SOLIS already covered this one. Second, force outs have been eliminated, meaning that player has to land in-bounds for a ball to be complete, regardless of whether he was pushed out by the DB or not. This could be huge–larger, more physical corners will become more valuable; smaller, lighter WRs will be at a disadvantage along the sideline; and jump balls along the sides or in the endzone will become even less likely to be completed. Finally, the five-yard facemask penalty has been removed, meaning that incidental contact is ok, but that any twisting or turning of the head will be 15 yards if flagged. Other than Corky Johnson, our team plays pretty clean and smart on defense, so I think I like this change and that it will–if anything–benefit the guys in Battle Red.

I woke up Sunday mornin’ with no way to hold my head that didn’t hurt

In the spirit of the holiday season, let us start with the good things from yesterday’s game. This will be a short list.

  • Mario Williams. Super Mario continued to show that he should not only be on the Pro Bowl roster, but should be a starter, putting up a sack in his sixth straight game and keeping pace as the AFC leader. It’s a bit premature, but I am going to come out and say it now–next year, anything less than 18 sacks will disappoint me. (He did get fooled on the Dallas Clark end around, but, Christ, who didn’t?)
  • Earl Cochran. I have no idea how he does it, but Earl gets to the ball more or less unblocked more often than not. Hell, he made a tackle on the RB eight yards downfield at one point. He’s fast, aggressive, and has fluid hips that allow him to turn in space. If we don’t keep him around, it’s a mistake.
  • Fred Bennett. I love The Fred. The back-to-back passes to Wayne (second one for a TD) notwithstanding, Fred played his ass off all day. 11 tackles, a forced fumble, two great breaks on balls to break up passes…the fact that he languished on the bench while Petey was out there stinking up the joint is still irritating. The good news, though, is that a Bennett/Dunta Robinson combo would mean we finally had two real CBs.
  • DeMeco Ryans. Injured knee nothing. It pretty much doesn’t matter which direction the play goes or where Ryans is lined up pre-snap–if the ball leaves the QBs hand, there is roughly a 74.4% chance that DeMeco will be in on the play that brings the ball carrier down. Amazing. The announcers–who, by the way, sucked–mentioned that over the last two seasons, Ryans has more tackles than ANYONE in football. He’s good like that.
  • Andre Johnson. Same as it ever was, AJ is just a monster. He’d have been even better Sunday had Sage not eyeball humped him as he ran his routes (more on that later).
  • Andre Davis. The man is a special teams ninja.
  • Matt Turk. Never a good sign when his 4 punts for a 44.5 yard average are a highlight.

Now for the bad. These are the little lumps of coal in the stocking of my life.

  • The secondary other than Fred Bennett. Will Demps seems to knock the crap out of people on every hit, yet, strangely, he doesn’t really knock people flat on their asses most of the time. I can’t figure it out. Case in point, Kenton Keith took Demps’ hit head on, paused briefly, and then moved forward for additional yards. I like Will and I’m glad he’s been so good for us, but this could be a problem. Even more of a problem is the fact that C.C. Brown only hits people with any sort of authority when they are extended or not looking. When the opposing player could see him coming, Brown was as harmless as a fart on a windy day Sunday. Even more irritating, though, was the way he played his position (or, more accurately, didn’t play his position). He was nowhere to be seen on Joe Addai’s TD run (Charlie Anderson also whiffed on this one, but Brown was noticeably absent behind him), he got juked out of his shorts by Clark in the open field, he nearly airballed when he went to shove Clark out of bounds later, he was late to pick up Wayne in the two-deep coverage after Bennett released him, and he vacated his position on Clark’s second TD catch. But Brown was an All-Pro compared to Von Hutchins, who was used and abused by Wayne until Kubiak adjusted and put Bennett on Reggie. He was absolutely roasted on the 42-yard bomb to Wayne near the end of the first quarter (Why was Demps up at linebacker depth before the snap on that play if he wasn’t blitzing and where was Brown? Or did someone think it was a good idea to see if Hutchins could run with Wayne?). AND Hutchins was so late closing on WRs that caught the ball in front of him that they were twice tackled by a linebacker who had to first turn and then chase them down. Oh, and then there was Jamar Fletcher
  • Sage Rosenfels. I sincerely hope that this game will hush the “Sage is Baby Jesus” talk. Even if you don’t want to say he failed as a starter, the fact is that he has never impressed someone to the point that he was “the guy” other than when he was replacing an injured starter. Sunday, he showed us why. There were at least five balls thrown behind receivers, two of which were picked. He stared down his receivers from the snap and threw directly where he was looking almost every time. He forced throws to Andre Johnson when Walter and/or Daniels were wide open. This guy is a solid backup, but if someone wants to give us value for him, holding on to him is borderline retarded, because he is never going to be anything more than a solid backup.
  • Darius Walker. I almost put him in the “good” list because he did look strong early and he ran the ball between the tackles well in the beginning stages of the second half. I put him here, however, because it became incredibly apparent that he is nowhere near fast enough to get the ball to the outside and create something out of nothing. The Colts adjusted to his early runs by keeping the LBs home and letting Walker decide whether to run into them or to take it outside where he was hauled down with minimal effort. Of course, seeing this, Kubiak decided it would be a good idea to pitch the ball to him eight yards behind the line and see what he could do (the answer: nothing). I like the idea of him as a third-down back, but that’s about it.
  • Travis Johnson. This gets its own post.
  • Kris Brown. You miss your only FG, you go on this list by default. Not a horrible game by the Husker, but he didn’t seem upset at all that he pushed that 49-yarder wide.
  • Vonta Leach. Question: What good is a fullback who misses on his lead blocking assignments? Answer: No good at all, regardless of whether the coach and QB try to force passes to him. Leach played like butt. Now, part of this might have been due to Walker’s lack of speed; blocking for someone slower than you are probably takes a different approach. Still…man…never a good day when the FB stands out.

Other notes from the contest:

  • Regardless of what the now-banned-commenter “Tom,” thinks, the problem Sunday was not the blitz getting burned. Only one of the TDs came against a blitz, and that was a weird phenomenon where we sent too many blitzers and the lanes got clogged up before we could get there. Otherwise, the problem was the Manning was picking apart our zone and then Reggie Wayne would abuse whomever was on him in man coverage. And that we couldn’t get to Manning whether we sent 4, 5, or 6 rushers. And that we couldn’t move the ball because Sage imploded after the second possession. AND because 3/4 of our secondary was playing like crap.
  • Kubiak’s playcalling left a lot to be desired. Outside runs with Walker, sending Kevin Walter on a 6 yard route when you need 8, not going for it on fourth when we should have, using Andre Johnson on a hitch screen from our own 25, etc. Uninspiring at best.
  • Owen Daniels continues to run hot and cold. He’ll make some great catches over the middle and get you all excited, only to irritate you when he alligator arms one in the face of a linebacker or fails to catch easy balls.
  • Tony Dungy may be the nicest guy in the NFL or in the whole world. He might be a great father, husband, coach, and author. But he looks like a whiny ninny when he stands there and yells “no, no, no!” at the refs after they called one of the most obvious horse-collar tackles you’ll ever see.
  • So much for the nine wins. At least we have one more crack at .500. I never thought I’d be so happy to be playing a team with absolutely nothing to play for. (Though you could argue that the Colts didn’t have much to play for, either…)

Odds and Ends

Random tidbits of stuff that I would normally do a full post on if this last fortnight hadn’t been ridiculously busy.

  • Apparently, someone has kidnapped Richard Justice and replaced him with Pollyanna Sunshine. I replied to the old “he can’t play” email with a message that said simply “care to retract this?” I expected another smart-ass answer, or no answer at all. Instead, I received his answer two minutes after I sent my message. “Yes, I do. That was wayyyyyy wrong.” Color me shocked.
  • BRB was all over this when it broke, but it appears Jerome Mathis (a) owns a number of pit bulls and (b) somehow managed to let some of them escape. Dumb? Sure. But also awesomely hilarious. Thank you, Jerome; you may not give the team anything on the field, but you just gave me an early Christmas present.
  • Not to be Debbie Downer (who is Pollyanna Sunshine’s goth cousin), but how painful is that loss to Atlanta now that you see the wheels completely off down there? Seriously, your coach just up and walked away from the team during the season so he could take the job with a middle-of-the-road SEC team that’s about to lose Darren McFadden and Felix Jones? That cannot be a good sign.
  • I realize I haven’t really posted anything about the win over Tampa Bay. Like a number of you, I was forced to follow on gamecast because the weather prevented me from getting a good Sirius signal in the house. My thoughts on the game, based on what I got from the live blog and what transpired on my computer screen, are as follows:
  • Mario Williams is a bad, bad man. I look for him to knock Jay Cutler somewhere into the middle of next week.
  • Morlon Greenwood is underrated (and I have been saying so since the preseason, thank you very much).
  • Andre Johnson against regular DBs is a lot like when I play against some of the third graders I coach. The fact
  • that we had to play without him for much of the year still pisses me off at Kubiak.
  • Why was totally-unproven Matt Schaub the most prized backup in football, but Sage gets almost no press at all? Shouldn’t we be able to get a couple second-rounders for him?
  • Will Demps is playing like a ninja. A love ninja. Really, other than gets rolled by Jamal Lewis a couple weeks ago, he’s been playing lights out. Which is really weird to say regarding any of our safeties since…um…ever.
  • Fred Bennett continues to impress. Jacoby Jones continues to disappoint. Petey Faggins continues to be not playing very much. These things are good, bad, and awesome, respectively.
  • I am strangely thrilled about having a Thursday night game. Which is only odd because, prior to this week, I was annoyed by the Thursday games. It’s a really cool idea (an extra night of football) that’s really poorly executed (a channel that a whole lot of people can’t get) and that gets in the way of my prognosticatin’ (because I generally do those on Friday or even Saturday). This week, though, it’s nothing but good.
  • UPDATE: It was pointed out by grungedave that I failed to mention that I am the greatest football prognosticator of all time. Pay no attention to the previous week when I was awful, because I rocked a solid 15-0 last week. That’s balls, baby. Big balls.

Dancing With the ‘Tards

It wasn’t all that long ago–four days, actually–that I said, “[a]s of now, unless one of the stories over there mentions me or this blog by name, I will not comment on or link to anything written by paid employees of the Houston Chronicle.” I meant it. However, I realized today that I needed to expand the exception slightly. We all know they are never going to link to me or BRB–we are beneath them, of course. So, I am expanding the exception to read “as of now, unless one of the stories over there mentions me or this blog by name, or is clearly referencing/replying to something I wrote, I will not comment on or link to anything written by paid employees of the Houston Chronicle.”

Which brings me to my actual post. It seems that John McClain’s latest missive attempts to answer the questions “why don’t we blitz” and, tangentially, “why Richard Smith is not a horrid coach.” Hmm. Interesting approach, General. Whatever made you think to approach that issue as answering a question? Because, correct me if I am wrong, but your article kind of reads like an attempt to respond to “how does a person who ignores the basic fundamental tenets of defense–things like ‘increasing QB pressure makes a shaky secondary better’ and ‘blitzing a linebacker will keep your pass-rushing DE from being routinely sodomized by two or three men’–seem less-capable at performing his job than any number of fans walking down the street?” by attacking the underlying assumptions about blitzing. But, then, you would never deign to read something as lowbrow and mindless as a–gasp!–blog written by a fan, would you? Of course not.

Just for a laugh and because I have nothing to do here at work, let’s examine your response a little more closely and see what, if anything, we can learn from it.

I’ve known defensive coordinator Richard Smith since he entered the NFL as an assistant under Jerry Glanville in 1988.

Congrats. I’m not really sure what that has to do with anything, but whatever.

If a psychiatrist put Smith on his couch and analyzed him, here’s what he would learn: Smith would blitz most of the time if he thought it would work. He’s a Glanville disciple. His nature is to attack, attack and attack some more.

He “would blitz more often if he thought it would work?” He hasn’t blitzed enough with this year’s team to have any idea whether it works. So, if he is just basing his decision on what he thinks of blitzing in general, I’m not sure you can call him aggressive.

So why doesn’t he do that with the Texans? Well, it’s simple. Blitzing for the sake of blitzing is bad coaching.

True, but blitzing for the sake of taking pressure of your young and/or below average secondary is good coaching. You should probably establish that we would be blitzing just for the sake of blitzing before you give your conclusory statements.

Fans who complain the Texans don’t blitz enough must not remember how many times it didn’t work or they got burned.

Ooooooooh, snap! You are talking about me, aren’t you, John? You showed me; after all, the lack of success of Texans teams in previous years certainly has a ton of bearing on whether this current unit would succeed. What’s that? Oh, I just received message from Captain Obvious that, no, it really doesn’t matter how previous Texans teams did. Interesting. You almost had me convinced, though.

Rushing more than four — usually one or two linebackers and sometimes a safety — is foolish if they don’t have the speed to pull it off.

John McClain, bringing the truisms today! Of course, the converse of that, that it is NOT foolish if they DO have the speed, is also true. And when I look at our LB corps, the one thing I see (especially out of DeMeco Ryans and Morlon Greenwood) is speed. Even Danny Clark is fast enough to blitz. You are making it sound like someone needs to run a 4.4 in order to be an effective pass rusher. Also, you conveniently overlook the possibility of working in some zone blitzes, which would allow us to create pressure through confusion while not leaving wide open holes underneath the secondary. In that scheme, the speed issue is negated somewhat (to the extent that it even exists) because you are still only sending four rushers. Now, of course we can’t solely run the zone blitz, but you can’t sit there and pretend that our linebackers are simply too slow and, thus, we have no options when it comes to pass rushing.

The coaches watch film of every game and practice over and over and over. They know what they get and don’t get with a four-man rush. They also know what they get and don’t get when they blitz.

It is good that they are watching game and practice tape. I’d be worried if they didn’t. But, saying they know what they get and don’t get when they blitz is nothing more than bit of sophistry. They don’t blitz enough to know what they get when they blitz. And, on the rare occasion that they do blitz, they have shown some success. DeMeco’s sack and a run stop for a loss against Atlanta came on a blitz. DeMeco’s sack, forced fumble, and first career TD against Tennessee came on a blitz. And, since you were the one who broached the subject of what past season’s blitzes have yielded, all 4 of Dunta’s career sacks came on blitzes. If anything, knowing what they get when they blitz should equate to “man, we’re having a little success when we mix that in.”

Right now, blitzing a safety could be disastrous. Rookie cornerback Fred Bennett has made three career starts. Veteran cornerback Von Hutchins has made three starts at his position. Leaving them in man coverage at this point in their careers is asking for trouble.

I don’t know why we would choose to blitz one of our safeties when we have ample speed/size/strength in the linebacking corps. Still, while your initial premise is fine, your reasoning is obtuse and idiotic. “Leaving them in man coverage…is asking for trouble?” Seriously? Well, then, why the hell do we keep leaving them in man coverage when we aren’t blitzing? It’s not like we are strictly playing zone; there is plenty of man coverage going on. Just look at the repeated immolation of Petey Faggins, especially in the Atlanta game. Most of that has been in man situations. So, I ask you, which is better–to leave them in man coverage for 2.5-3.5 seconds during a blitz or for 3.5-5 seconds without the blitz?

Think about this: Cleveland quarterback Derek Anderson’s strength is throwing down the field. The Texans determined that rushing four and dropping seven, forcing Anderson to throw underneath the coverage, made more sense than blitzing and leaving their defensive backs in man coverage against tight end Kellen Winslow and receiver Braylon Edwards.

What the hell? You did watch that game, right? Winslow had 10 catches for 107 yards and a TD. THAT is your proof that the existing plan is somehow better than forcing the QB to make throws more quickly? And, besides, like I keep screaming about, a zone blitz would not necessitate much of a deviation from the zone coverage that you seem to think is working wonders.

The Texans’ defense played well enough to beat Cleveland. All three Browns touchdowns came after mistakes — two interceptions and a missed field goal.

OK. So, aside from when they messed up, they played well enough to win. Fair enough. But what does that have to do with whether they should also have been blitzing? Nothing. You are simply trying to confuse the issue here. “They played well enough to win” does not equal “there is no need to blitz because this system works just fine.” Some of your sycophant cabana boys might buy into this sort of “logic,” but I don’t. Nor does anyone with half a brain.

Now, if the Texans are going to blitz and leave their corners in man coverage, it makes sense to do it against the Titans because they don’t have receivers like Cleveland’s, right? Oops! They did that in the first game against Tennessee, and Roydell Williams caught a 46-yard pass against Dunta Robinson to set up the winning field goal.

First, I was at that game and saw the play with my own eyes. There was a safety in the area who, for whatever reason, did not roll over the top and help Dunta. This is not pure man coverage you are talking about. Second, Dunta played that route as well as humanly possible, but simply missed when he stuck his hand up, so I am not clear on what this completion “proves” with respect to the blitz. Third, whether you are blitzing, rushing four, or rushing none, that route unfolds exactly the same way; it’s not like Morlon Greenwood covering in the flat would have changed the direction of that ball. Fourth, why do you keep trying to make it sound like the options are only “blitz with man coverage” and “don’t blitz with zone coverage?” Why do you ignore zone blitzing or even sending one linebacker and still playing a two-deep zone? Finally, stop pretending like we are not already leaving these guys in man coverage from time to time and consider whether those situations would be easier for the corners if they were covering for a shorter period of time.

You are making no sense here, John. If the problem is that the secondary is shaky (it is), then blitzing slightly more often is going to alleviate that problem somewhat. Note: no one is suggesting that we need to play like the Eagles and bring some kind of blitz on nearly every play. What we are suggesting is that Richard Smith’s approach to the game suggests that either he is too timid in his play-calling as a matter of course, that he is deathly afraid of getting yelled at if a play fails, or that he simply doesn’t see the flaws in his/your reasoning clearly enough to understand how to fix them. None of those scenarios is an acceptable answer, however. As Stephanie pointed out in her comment:

I cannot think of a single reason why the Texans should keep Richard Smith.

You know, I really try to be fair to people. But really, I can’t think of a reason to keep him. He wasn’t the Texans first choice, and if there are options out there to replace him, I’d like them to do it.

Here’s some additional reasons against:

1. He has no defensive philosophy other than “Don’t do the thing that sucked really bad in last weeks game.”

2. He has no record as a solo defensive coordinator before coming to the Texans.

3. He previously was the co-defensive coordinator of a 3-4. But only in name only because Saban really ran that defense and ran all the meetings.

4. Last year, he put pictures of rocks in the defensive players’ lockers to tell them that they are part of a rock. Yeah, that’s inspiring to the younger generation. Rocks don’t bring much of a pass rush either because well, they are rocks.

5. He’s a yell at the players guy. I don’t like yell at the players guy unless they are the best at what they do. If you yell all the time, and you don’t have the respect of the guys you are coaching because you’ve never accomplished anything, well then, you are just annoying.

6. If the players for the other offense call your defense “vanilla” before you have even played them (Winslow), it means they have no respect for it at all.

7. There is no 7.

8. I am thinking of burning an old 8 jersey as part of an anti-jinx against that number for a Texans QB.

9. It makes me physically ill to see 3rd and longs just wasted by the Texans defense. You know, “Great it’s 3rd and 8.” And then “@#$%, they just completed a pass for 24 yards.”

10. Did you have the thought when watching the Eagles play the Patriots the other night that Smith could have ten years with the Texans, and never bring the sort of stuff on D that the Eagles were doing to the Patriots? I get the same sort of training wheels feeling watching the Texans defense as I did when I watched Pendry’s offense in 2005. Very simple to avoid big mistakes. I know the Texans have a lot of injuries on defense, but it’s hard to watch.

Basically, why should ANYONE have confidence in what Smith is doing? There’s nothing in his background that should convince fans or the players that he knows what the hades he is doing and that it is going to get better.

Funny, John, it seems like everyone who is writing about this issue has a solid understanding of the little things, like “logic” and “reasoning” and “coherent arguments” and “basic tenets of football defense.” Maybe you should give that a shot.

I realize I am being flippant and kind of a jerk here. That is intentional, as it is the same approach John and the others like to take when they are forced to slum it and respond to people who disagree with them. The only difference here is that I also attempted to offer a counter-argument in between jabs at McClain.

(Ironically enough, in the comments to the post about blitzing, Will asked how long it would be before the Chron picked up on the idea and had a story about our lack of blitzing. Apparently, the answer is two days.)

There’s a full moon rising on the Cuyahoga River