Richard Smith and the Mystery of Pass Coverage

If you have read any of the previous Xs/Os things here at DGDB&D, it should be pretty clear that I am defense-first kind of guy. For every one article on zone blocking, there are at least four on some aspect of our defense or lack thereof.  It’s not that I don’t like offense, but given the choice I’d prefer to see Mario Williams knock someone unconscious than watch Owen Daniels get a first down.  I’m just odd, I s’pose.

Anyway, because I’m a defensive guy, watching Richard Smith’s approach to my favorite side of the ball has been especially painful.  Whether it’s repeatedly dropping Mario into coverage against a Tennessee team that didn’t really throw into the flat all day or benching his best cornerback in favor of someone who is in the conversation for worst player in the NFL, Smith consistently does everything wrong—and, conversely, nothing right—in his defensive playcalling.  We’ve covered the lack of blitzing and general lack of common sense and even offered up a possible solution (that Smith would never apply because it takes courage and vision).

The one thing we haven’t really covered, however, except in post-game griping and general comments about defensive failure, is our pass-coverage philosophy.  Yet, after seeing the predictable result of Petey Faggins one-on-one with a WR that only Nnamdi Asomugah could cover, I think it’s about time to tackle the defensive backfield.  I hope to tackle it better than Will Demps is tackling right now.

First, some background.  The Texans play a mix of man coverage (usually in the form of Cover-1 or Cover-2 Man) and Cover-2 zone.  Just so we are all on the same page, let’s look at each of those schemes.  (Note: as always, we are talking in generalizations here.  There are a million tiny variations to all of these…none of which Richard Smith understands.)

Man/Cover-1 Theory.  Our most common form of man coverage is the Cover-1.  (Our second-most common form is the Cover-2 Man, but we’ll hit on that in a minute.)  In Cover-1, the defense has one deep defender at or near the middle of the field (relative to the sidelines) and he is responsible for deep help.  Underneath, you will generally have pure man coverage from your CBs and LBs, with the other safety—usually the SS—free to assist in man coverage, sneak up for run support, or blitz.

If you are paying attention, you can see the biggest flaw in the Cover-1: the deep safety is responsible for a TON of real estate and if he lacks the speed or guesses wrong on where to go, it is almost impossible for him to recover.  Thus a Cover-1 requires a very good FS in the deep coverage.

Under Gregg Williams, the Redskins ran a Cover-1 as a base package quite a bit, with the thinking being that Sean Taylor was more than capable of playing the role.  He was, but Williams continually failed to realize that the scheme put a tremendous amount of pressure on his corners—because they absolutely had to avoid getting burned deep—and they were most certainly not up to that task.  Nevertheless, Williams’ reputation as an aggressive play-caller—a myth that we already addressed before the season—was due in large part to the Cover-1’s requirements.

What I mean by this is, because of the inherent flaw in Cover-1, teams that employ that coverage try to be more aggressive up front to prevent the opponent from having enough time to stretch the field and develop multiple deep routes, thereby protecting the safety.  To do this, the Cover-1 attempts to employ many different blitz packages/man assigments, most of which revolve around bringing the SS up to LB depth and, from here, either blitzing him or blitzing a LB or CB with that safety picking up the appropriate receiver.  For this to be effective, however, any non-blitzing CBs/LBs (especially the WLB) have to be able to cover until the pressure gets to the QB.

Cover-1 also suffers from plenty of room after the catch, as most or all of the underneath defenders are locked up in man coverage of their own and, should a WR catch the ball, are not in position to make a quick tackle.  (Think Greg Camarillo on a slant.)

Why it doesn’t work for the Texans. I think you see where I am going with this.  Basically, in this coverage, you are asking Will Demps to cover sideline to sideline, Brandon Harrison (or, prior, C.N. Brown) to lock up in man coverage, and Petey Faggins and Jacques Reeves to maintain tight man coverage until Richard Smith’s non-effective blitz package gets to the QB.  It should come as no surprise that, in the aforementioned Immolation Of The Faggins looked to be in Cover-1.  [EDIT:  Triple347 says the Johnson completion was in quarter-quarter-half coverage.  See comments for discussion.

Even worse, though, is that Smith bastardizes the hell out of his Cover-1.  Far be it from him to send the SS on a blitz.  No, he utilizes the SS almost entirely in pass coverage from the LB depth.  Meaning that teams with even two games worth of film on the Texans' D quickly figure out that the SS is bluffing and, thus, they don't try to account for him in blitz pickup.  Instead, they take advantage of the fact that our SSs don't backpedal all that well---most don't---and they abuse him in coverage or throw over the top of him if he is dropping back into a middle zone.

When Brown/Harrison aren't all the way up at LB depth, Smith sneaks the up toward the middle of the field and in behind DeMeco Ryans, almost as if they are playing some kind of non-commital run support.  Behind our best tackler.  Because he apparently needs the backup?

Cover-2/Cover-2 Man.  "Cover-2" might be the most overused and misunderstood phrase in football defense today.  Pretty much all teams will occasionally come out in something resembling a Cover-2, but most have a wrinkle of some sort because most lack the personnel to effectively run a true Cover-2.

Cover-2 is a 2-deep, 5-under zone system.  In this coverage, both safeties are responsible for half of the deep part of the field.  The CBs are in press coverage and are each responsible for 1/5th of the short/intermediate zone underneath the two safeties.  The three linebackers are each responsible for another 1/5.  Because the safeties will generally line up between their respective hashmark and the sideline and because they will work toward the sideline at the snap, the biggest hole in the Cover-2 coverage is in between them, behind the MLB.

[Quick side-note:  The Tampa-2 variant drops the MLB into deeper coverage to address the hole in the straight Cover-2 and has the CBs/remaining LBs responsible for 1/4th of the field each.]

Whereas the Cover-1 attempts to be aggressive up front to prevent the big play, the Cover-2 typically uses just the four-man rush and attempts to take away the big play by going into a bend-don’t-break mode.  There are holes in the coverage between the zones, so teams will tend to throw underneath the two safeties, which is just what the defense is encouraging.

In Cover-2 Man, the safeties still play the same way, but the coverage underneath is pure man.  The safeties help with deep coverage into their zones, but the man coverage will stay with the receivers through those zones as well, effectively leading to double-coverage on deep routes.

Regardless of whether the team is in Cover-2 or Cover-2 Man, the one place they should never, ever get beat deep is on the sidelines.  The CBs have the WRs through the intermediate zone and the safeties, who moved toward the sideline at the snap, pick them up as they get deeper.  Assuming your safeties can do that (and that your CBs consider basic things like “turn your head” and “don’t get roasted off the line”), the Cover-2 allows you to force teams to throw short-to-intermediate passes toward the middle of the field (thereby giving you the added benefit of forcing the opposition to throw the ball past many more hands), with the safeties coming up to make quick tackles.  Of course, that also requires that you have safeties that tackle well…

Why this doesn’t work for the Texans. Again, I think you see where this is headed.  The corners that Smith insists on giving the most reps are incapable of defending balls thrown over the top of them. The safeties seem incapable of giving help in the intermediate zone or in picking up WRs as they come into the deep zone.  Will Demps especially has the annoying habit of letting the WR coming into his zone get past him before he reacts.

It is telling that we are CONSISTENTLY beat along the sidelines at every depth.  The basic tenets of this coverage require that you have safeties who can defend the go/corner routes, not let WRs get behind them, and, most importantly, don’t get so worried about the underneath stuff that you bite on double-move.  Simply put, we don’t have that.

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You see the most glaring common weakness through the whole discussion as it pertains to us?  OUR SAFETIES ARE NOT GOOD ENOUGH TO RUN ANY OF THE COVERAGES WE ARE ASKING THEM TO RUN.  Oh, sure, our Faggins and Reeves are very bad and they deserve their fair share of the blame—blame I am more than happy to heap on Petey at every opportunity—but at least we have Dunta Robinson, Fred Bennett, and Antwaun Molden available.  Cornerback could theoretically be fixed if the DC would use some common sense.  But we are stuck with the safety corps that we currently feature.

So, how to fix it?  By “hiding” the safeties in a Cover-3!

Cover-3 Theory.  If you didn’t know it before, by now you’ve realized that the number in Cover-# refers to the numbers of players in the deep zone.  It’s a handy shorthand, but it does tend to oversimplify things.  Regardless, in the Cover-3, there are (shocking!) three guys in the deep zone, with each responsible for 1/3 of the field.  But here’s the wrinkle: unlike the Cover-2, where the two deep players are safeties, the Cover-3 generally uses two corners and a safety in the deep zone.

in a standard 2-corner, 2-safety scheme, it works like this: On the snap, the FS moves toward the middle of the field.  The two corners are playing up near the line and they break back, basically running with the WRs while working back to their deep thirds.  The SS is freed to rotate into the flat, or blitz, or fill a LB zone if one of them blitzes, or any number of other things.  Also, because he’s not responsible for a deep third, the SS does not have to be able to run with deep routes or backpedal all that well, so you make up for a lack of speed/cover skills at SS.  The OLBs are responsible for the flats or hook zones, while the MLB is responsible for the intermediate middle (DeMeco would excel in this because of his sideline-to-sideline speed).  In one fell swoop, you limited what you are asking each safety to do, you’ve created a situation where DeMeco is utilized to his full ability, you’ve maximized the value of the physical corners (Robinson, Bennett, possibly Molden) because you are allowing them to jam at the line and then run with the route so they can defend the short or intermediate stuff, AND you are putting your OLBs in a position to blitz or cover the hook zone rather than try to run man-to-man with a TE.  And if you can teach him to turn his head, Reeves’ speed would be a huge asset in getting back to his deep third, so even he would be improved.

Sounds cool, no?  But here’s where it gets even better.  You can run all sorts of shapes and formations out of it.  You can disguise it as man coverage by keeping the SS back in his normal spot with the CBs in press coverage.  You can move the SS up into the box for run support or to blitz him.  You can blitz one of the OLBs and abandon the hook zone, assuming you’ll get to him before the WR gets open in the hook/short zone, or have the SS fill that hook zone and hope the QB tries to throw behind the blitz.  You can run a zone blitz in front of the Cover-3, something that would be near impossible in the Cover-2, with the DE dropping into the flat.

And there’s more—you can even change up your personnel within the scheme or the scheme within the personnel.  Because the FS is playing deep center field and ball hawking, you could occasionally put Dunta in that role, with Molden and Bennett playing jam coverage, thereby getting your big physical corners on the field at the same time while also freeing up Dunta to try to knock people out.  You could slide an athletic linebacker like Xavier Adibi into the SS role and have him up in the box doing the same thing your SS would be doing in the straight Cover-3. You can disguise the coverage and confuse the opponent by playing zone on one side while still letting Fred Bennett lock up in man coverage on the other side.  Hell, you can run the Cover-3 with your nickel package, with one corner locking up in man, one dropping into a deep third, and both safeties staying back.  (You’ll notice that ALL these iterations ask the safeties to do less than we are currently asking them to do, while attempting to create some confusion and pressure up front and maintain deep coverage across the entire deep zone.)

Now, of course, all defenses have holes and inherent weaknesses.  Cover-3 is no different.  It is particularly susceptible to short routes if the CBs are selling out to get back to their deep zones quickly.  This can be overcome somewhat by cheating out just a little bit with the OLBs and getting them into the flats more quickly.  Additionally, you can swap coverage zones every now and then—for example, have the SS retreat into the deep zone the CB rotate up into the hook/flat zone if you catch a QB trying to consistently throw underneath the retreating CB.  Even with these drawbacks and flaws, I know I would feel a lot better asking Bennett to react to a quick hitch than asking Will Demps to make an open field tackle.  (And I’m fairly confident that the 96-yarder to Calvin Johnson doesn’t happen if we are in Cover-3.)

***

Take just a second and think about this whole discussion.  You have three basic coverage philosophies here.  Your personnel is a bad fit for one, a horrible fit for one, and a pretty good fit for one.  Why in the name of Durga would the bad one and the horrible one get used extensively while the pretty good fit gets left on the bench beside your best cover corner?

The answer, best I can tell, is because Richard Smith is trying to kill me.

I have a great idea! I’ll get an average looking chick with a 73 IQ to make videos with me!!!

Well, isn’t this interesting? It seems that John McClain, Anna-Megan Raley, and two or three other Chron people have done a song parody, “Big Bad Schaub” (to the tune, obviously, of Jimmy Dean’s “Big Bad John.”)

Hmm. I could swear that I’ve recent seen song parodies somewhere else. Where was that? Oh wait…that’s right! I did them under the heading of Idiot Karaoke! And, if you’ve been reading this site for more than two weeks–in which case, you should know that Homeland Security is likely watching you–you probably noticed the “coincidence,” too.

Am I saying they stole my idea? No, not directly. I am suggesting it as a possibility, however, because I think it’s curious that just over two weeks after my first parodies of old country songs, the video maven and his vapid lap dog decided to do a parody of an old country song.

Could it really be a coincidence? Possibly. But, when you consider that in their hours of videos, they have never–to my knowledge, at least–done a song parody of any kind, it seems a little more than coincidental. When you combine this with the fact that BRB and Fanhouse linked to the original parody, “I Blame The Line,” and that the post received a good reaction from pretty much everyone, I think I have to call shenanigans.

To be fair, as Stephanie pointed out in an email to me, Chance McClain is an actual musician of some sort and has written songs about the Texans. Fair enough. In my mind, however, that makes my accusation even more likely–if McClain has access to a musician, why did it never enter his mind to do a parody song about a player until right after I did it?

As I see it, there are two possibilities. First, McClain and Anna-Tard put their heads together, sorted through the insipid spew that Anna-Megan likely offers, and totally independent of this blog decided to parody a–something they’d never done before–and it just happened to be both an old country song and soon after I had done that exact thing. Possible, I guess. Second, one or both of them saw my parody and thought it would be fun to do the same, so they enlisted the help of Chance McClain.

Think I am paranoid and crazy? Maybe, but look at it this way–if Tim or Scott or Stephanie or Texans Gab or Texans Tailgate started doing parodies of old country songs about players, it would not be a stretch to say that they stole the idea from here. Why should McClain and the Chron people get a free pass from suspicion just because he whores himself out on video with regularity? Occam’s Razor, bitches.

So, do I care? Only a little. I like the people at the Chron in general. (After all, they did link to my edited mirror of this blog and put it on their main Texans page. That was cool.) At the same time, I have heard from a couple different emailers that some of the Chron writers have talked some smack about this blog being “not funny,” “rude,” and/or just written “to get a response.” OK, so maybe the first two accusations are true, at least to some people. But the third? Blow me. I am nothing if not transparent here–I sign my name to everything, I cite sources on nearly every story I write, and I don’t write anything I don’t believe myself (though, in cases like the “we should sign Simeon Rice” post, I was drunk at the time). So, to the extent that some of these people have taken exception to what I am doing here, I take exception to the idea that someone would so blatantly steal an idea. A little recognition, like a fucking hat tip or a “we saw this here and thought it would be fun to do one,” is not asking too much.

[Final side-note: I know that McClain and his posse did a remake of "The Night Before Christmas" last December. I do not consider that as evidence that they didn't rip DGDB&D off because (a) that's a fucking poem and (b) it's not a classic country song.]

UPDATE: Paul mentions that McClain has been talking about this song for “weeks” on 610. If his idea predates 9/14, then I fully admit that I am wrong. (About the song; I stand by the idea that Anna-Megan is less-than-adequate at best.) Of course, he might have also stole it from an 80s Oilers record, but whatever. Anyone know when he first mentioned it?

SECOND UPDATE: So, it seems, I jumped the gun on this. Fair enough. I am man enough to admit when I am wrong.